

### **DU MPhil Phd in Sociology**

Sr.No	Question Id	Question Description	Question Body
1	24104	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q01	<p>In the fall of 2011, global media were characterized by strikingly similar images of the repression of urban citizen movements throughout the world. Similar military tactics were used to dislodge protesters from Tahrir Square in Egypt and Occupy encampments in the U.S., among other examples, raising the question of whether security forces in these different contexts do indeed collaborate, and to what extent. In his latest work, <i>Cities Under Siege</i>, Stephen Graham—co-author of the classic <i>Splintering Urbanism</i>—provides a probing insight into this question, which is both descriptive and interrogative. The multi-thematic, 400-page-plus book revolves around one main argument: that experiments in urban warfare in cities of the global south have led to the increasing militarization of North American and European cities, in a classic example of Foucault's 'boomerang effect.' Drawing on historical examples of the transfer of models of urban warfare and surveillance from the space of the colony to that of the metropole (see Ross 1994), Graham understands a similar transfer of techniques to be occurring in the present. By juxtaposing the proliferation of security within cities of the Global North, the 'urbicide' in Palestinian and Iraqi cities, the militaristic undertones of U.S. car culture, and the worldwide proliferation of U.S. military bases, he aims to show "...how resurgent imperialism and its geographies characteristic of the contemporary era umbilically connect cities within metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries." (p. xxvii). The result of this process he calls 'new military urbanism.' . . . The first three chapters touch on the broad themes of the militarization of cities of the global south and parts of cities of the global north, and the ideological binaries (Manichean geographies) that legitimize this militarization. Graham then discusses the multiple ways in which the 'new military urbanism' is manifested, including the multiplication and militarization of borders, an increased collaboration between police and military, a creep in function between neoliberal and security infrastructure, and a tendency to conflate internal urban minorities with external enemies. On this basis, the book then moves into a series of thematic chapters dealing with the proliferation of borders and surveillance within urban settings, ranging from the increased technologization and depersonalization of war, to 'urbicide' and targeting of urban infrastructure in military operations. Graham then discusses the role of the U.S., from the simultaneous proliferation of urban military bases abroad to domestic urban training centers to the spread of large militaristic SUVs in U.S. cities. The book closes with a focus on urban counter-geographies. [Source: Illaria Giglioli, book review of Stephen Graham's <i>Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism</i>, in <i>Berkeley Planning Journal</i>, 2012, 25 (1): 235 -239.] The author of the above passage is:</p>

firstRanker.com

2	24105	DU_J19_MPHIL_SO_CIO_Q02	<p>In the fall of 2011, global media were characterized by strikingly similar images of the repression of urban citizen movements throughout the world. Similar military tactics were used to dislodge protesters from Tahrir Square in Egypt and Occupy encampments in the U.S., among other examples, raising the question of whether security forces in these different contexts do indeed collaborate, and to what extent. In his latest work, <i>Cities Under Siege</i>, Stephen Graham—co-author of the classic <i>Splintering Urbanism</i>—provides a probing insight into this interrogative. The multi-thematic, 400-page-plus book revolves around one main argument: that experiments in urban warfare in cities of the global south have led to the increasing militarization of North American and European cities, in a classic example of Foucault's 'boomerang effect.' Drawing on historical examples of the transfer of models of urban warfare and surveillance from the space of the colony to that of the metropole (see Ross 1994), Graham understands a similar transfer of techniques to be occurring in the present. By juxtaposing the proliferation of security within cities of the Global North, the 'urbicide' in Palestinian and Iraqi cities, the militaristic undertones of U.S. car culture, and the worldwide proliferation of U.S. military bases, he aims to show "...how resurgent imperialism and its geographies characteristic of the contemporary era umbilically connect cities within metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries." (p. xxvii). The result of this process he calls 'new military urbanism.' . . . The first three chapters touch on the broad themes of the militarization of cities of the global south and parts of cities of the global north, and the ideological binaries (Manichean geographies) that legitimize this militarization. Graham then discusses the multiple ways in which the 'new military urbanism' is manifested, including the multiplication and militarization of borders, an increased collaboration between police and military, a creep in function between neoliberal and security infrastructure, and a tendency to conflate internal urban minorities with external enemies. On this basis, the book then moves into a series of thematic chapters dealing with the proliferation of borders and surveillance within urban settings, ranging from the increased technologization and depersonalization of war, to 'urbicide' and targeting of urban infrastructure in military operations. Graham then discusses the role of the U.S., from the simultaneous proliferation of urban military bases abroad to domestic urban training centers to the spread of large militaristic SUVs in U.S. cities. The book closes with a focus on urban counter-geographies. [Source: Illaria Giglioli, book review of Stephen Graham's <i>Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism</i>, in <i>Berkeley Planning Journal</i>, 2012, 25 (1): 235 -239.] Based on the above passage, what does the book review focus on?</p>
---	-------	-------------------------	---

firstRanker.com  
www..

firstranker.com

firstranker.com

3	24106	DU_J19_MPHIL_SO_CIO_Q03	<p>In the fall of 2011, global media were characterized by strikingly similar images of the repression of urban citizen movements throughout the world. Similar military tactics were used to dislodge protesters from Tahrir Square in Egypt and Occupy encampments in the U.S., among other examples, raising the question of whether security forces in these different contexts do indeed collaborate, and to what extent. In his latest work, <i>Cities Under Siege</i>, Stephen Graham—co-author of the classic <i>Splintering Urbanism</i>—provides a probing insight into this interrogative. The multi-thematic, 400-page-plus book revolves around one main argument: that experiments in urban warfare in cities of the global south have led to the increasing militarization of North American and European cities, in a classic example of Foucault's 'boomerang effect.' Drawing on historical examples of the transfer of models of urban warfare and surveillance from the space of the colony to that of the metropole (see Ross 1994), Graham understands a similar transfer of techniques to be occurring in the present. By juxtaposing the proliferation of security within cities of the Global North, the 'urbicide' in Palestinian and Iraqi cities, the militaristic undertones of U.S. car culture, and the worldwide proliferation of U.S. military bases, he aims to show "...how resurgent imperialism and its geographies characteristic of the contemporary era umbilically connect cities within metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries." (p. xxvii). The result of this process he calls 'new military urbanism.' . . . The first three chapters touch on the broad themes of the militarization of cities of the global south and parts of cities of the global north, and the ideological binaries (Manichean geographies) that legitimize this militarization. Graham then discusses the multiple ways in which the 'new military urbanism' is manifested, including the multiplication and militarization of borders, an increased collaboration between police and military, a creep in function between neoliberal and security infrastructure, and a tendency to conflate internal urban minorities with external enemies. On this basis, the book then moves into a series of thematic chapters dealing with the proliferation of borders and surveillance within urban settings, ranging from the increased technologization and depersonalization of war, to 'urbicide' and targeting of urban infrastructure in military operations. Graham then discusses the role of the U.S., from the simultaneous proliferation of urban military bases abroad to domestic urban training centers to the spread of large militaristic SUVs in U.S. cities. The book closes with a focus on urban counter-geographies. [Source: Illaria Giglioli, book review of Stephen Graham's <i>Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism</i>, in <i>Berkeley Planning Journal</i>, 2012, 25 (1): 235 -239.] Based on the above passage, which of the following statements is incorrect.</p>
---	-------	-------------------------	---

firstRanker.com

4	24107	DU_J19_MPHIL_SO_CIO_Q04	<p>In the fall of 2011, global media were characterized by strikingly similar images of the repression of urban citizen movements throughout the world. Similar military tactics were used to dislodge protesters from Tahrir Square in Egypt and Occupy encampments in the U.S., among other examples, raising the question of whether security forces in these different contexts do indeed collaborate, and to what extent. In his latest work, <i>Cities Under Siege</i>, Stephen Graham—co-author of the classic <i>Splintering Urbanism</i>—provides a probing insight into this interrogative. The multi-thematic, 400-page-plus book revolves around one main argument: that experiments in urban warfare in cities of the global south have led to the increasing militarization of North American and European cities, in a classic example of Foucault's 'boomerang effect.' Drawing on historical examples of the transfer of models of urban warfare and surveillance from the space of the colony to that of the metropole (see Ross 1994), Graham understands a similar transfer of techniques to be occurring in the present. By juxtaposing the proliferation of security within cities of the Global North, the 'urbicide' in Palestinian and Iraqi cities, the militaristic undertones of U.S. car culture, and the worldwide proliferation of U.S. military bases, he aims to show "...how resurgent imperialism and its geographies characteristic of the contemporary era umbilically connect cities within metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries." (p. xxvii). The result of this process he calls 'new military urbanism.' . . . The first three chapters touch on the broad themes of the militarization of cities of the global south and parts of cities of the global north, and the ideological binaries (Manichean geographies) that legitimize this militarization. Graham then discusses the multiple ways in which the 'new military urbanism' is manifested, including the multiplication and militarization of borders, an increased collaboration between police and military, a creep in function between neoliberal and security infrastructure, and a tendency to conflate internal urban minorities with external enemies. On this basis, the book then moves into a series of thematic chapters dealing with the proliferation of borders and surveillance within urban settings, ranging from the increased technologization and depersonalization of war, to 'urbicide' and targeting of urban infrastructure in military operations. Graham then discusses the role of the U.S., from the simultaneous proliferation of urban military bases abroad to domestic urban training centers to the spread of large militaristic SUVs in U.S. cities. The book closes with a focus on urban counter-geographies. [Source: Illaria Giglioli, book review of Stephen Graham's <i>Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism</i>, in <i>Berkeley Planning Journal</i>, 2012, 25 (1): 235 -239.] Based on the above passage, what is a characteristic of 'new military urbanisms'?</p>
---	-------	-------------------------	---

firstranker.com

5	24108	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q05	<p>In the fall of 2011, global media were characterized by strikingly similar images of the repression of urban citizen movements throughout the world. Similar military tactics were used to dislodge protesters from Tahrir Square in Egypt and Occupy encampments in the U.S., among other examples, raising the question of whether security forces in these different contexts do indeed collaborate, and to what extent. In his latest work, <i>Cities Under Siege</i>, Stephen Graham—co-author of the classic <i>Splintering Urbanism</i>—provides a probing insight into this interrogative. The multi-thematic, 400-page-plus book revolves around one main argument: that experiments in urban warfare in cities of the global south have led to the increasing militarization of North American and European cities, in a classic example of Foucault's 'boomerang effect.' Drawing on historical examples of the transfer of models of urban warfare and surveillance from the space of the colony to that of the metropole (see Ross 1994), Graham understands a similar transfer of techniques to be occurring in the present. By juxtaposing the proliferation of security within cities of the Global North, the 'urbicide' in Palestinian and Iraqi cities, the militaristic undertones of U.S. car culture, and the worldwide proliferation of U.S. military bases, he aims to show "...how resurgent imperialism and its geographies characteristic of the contemporary era umbilically connect cities within metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries." (p. xxvii). The result of this process he calls 'new military urbanism.' . . . The first three chapters touch on the broad themes of the militarization of cities of the global south and parts of cities of the global north, and the ideological binaries (Manichean geographies) that legitimize this militarization. Graham then discusses the multiple ways in which the 'new military urbanism' is manifested, including the multiplication and militarization of borders, an increased collaboration between police and military, a creep in function between neoliberal and security infrastructure, and a tendency to conflate internal urban minorities with external enemies. On this basis, the book then moves into a series of thematic chapters dealing with the proliferation of borders and surveillance within urban settings, ranging from the increased technologization and depersonalization of war, to 'urbicide' and targeting of urban infrastructure in military operations. Graham then discusses the role of the U.S., from the simultaneous proliferation of urban military bases abroad to domestic urban training centers to the spread of large militaristic SUVs in U.S. cities. The book closes with a focus on urban counter-geographies. [Source: Illaria Giglioli, book review of Stephen Graham's <i>Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism</i>, in <i>Berkeley Planning Journal</i>, 2012, 25 (1): 235 -239.] Who does the author attribute the "boomerang effect" to?</p>
---	-------	--------------------------------	--

--	--	--	--	--

firstRanker.com  
www.FirstRanker.com

6	24110	DU_J19_MPHIL_SO CIO_Q06	<p>Despite the abundance of material, there have been few systematic works on comparative political systems of primitive societies. In the available literature, two main approaches are discerned. The first, best exemplified by <i>African Political Systems</i> (Fortes and Evans 1940), is to differentiate between the "stateless," so-called segmentary societies and societies with centralized governmental and political organizations. Aidan W. Southall's famous monograph <i>Alur Society</i> not only quoted Durkheim's definition of "segmentary" but also developed his own conception of "segmentary structure" and "segmentary system". The second approach to the study of comparative primitive political institutions is exemplified in the works of Colson (1954), Gluckman (1954a) and Peristiany (1954): a somewhat different point of view, Hoebel (1954). While most of these works deal with one tribe or society, they provide, either explicitly or by implication, possible comparative applications. Their main concern has been to show that in all primitive societies – ranging from small bands of hunters or fishermen to kingdoms such as those of Zulu, Swazi, and Dinka – there exists some basic mechanism of social control which regulates the affairs of the society and resolves conflicts arising among its component groups. In the words of Gluckman (1954a), "the most important among these mechanisms are 'the inherent tendencies of groups to segment and then to become bound together by cross-cutting alliances.'" The general assumption is that most of these mechanisms are in one way or another common to all primitive societies-whether "segmentary," centralized or some other. This approach poses the problem of the conditions under which various regulatory mechanisms operate, either through specialized roles and organizations, or through specialized roles and organizations devoted mainly to the performance of regulatory tasks. Also implicit in some of these studies is the question of which area of life (economic, ritual, and so forth) makes such regulation most important and necessary. Hoebel's work on primitive law touches on these problems, mainly from the standpoint of the development of legal institutions. The studies summarized above have laid the foundations for the comparative study of primitive political institutions, but they are inadequate in several ways. First, there has been little comparative work using the criteria of comparison offered; second, some of these criteria have not been sufficiently systematic, as shown by Smith (1956); third, there has been too great an emphasis on the groups which perform governmental functions rather than on the functions themselves and an inadequate differentiation between various types of governmental functions; and fourth, there have been few attempts to relate the organization of various political functions to the aspects of the social organization.[Source: S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis", in <i>American Anthropologist</i>, 1959, 61(2):200-220]</p> <p>are the different types of political systems found in Africa?</p>
---	-------	----------------------------	---

--	--	--	--	--

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

7	24111	DU_J19_MPHIL_SO_CIO_Q07	<p>Despite the abundance of material, there have been few systematic works on comparative political systems of primitive societies. In the available literature, two main approaches are discerned. The first, best exemplified by <i>African Political Systems</i> (Fortes and Evans 1940), is to differentiate between the "stateless," so-called segmentary societies and societies with centralized governmental and political organizations. Aidan W. Southall's famous monograph <i>Alur Society</i> not only quoted Durkheim's definition of "segmentary system" but also developed his own conception of "segmentary structure" and "segmentary system". The second approach to the study of comparative primitive political institutions is exemplified in the works of Colson (1954), Gluckman (1954a) and Peristiany (1954): a somewhat different point of view, Hoebel (1954). While most of these works deal with one tribe or society, they provide, either explicitly or by implication, possible comparative applications. Their main concern has been to show that in all primitive societies – ranging from small bands of hunters or fishermen to kingdoms such as those of Zulu, Swazi, and Dinka – there exists some basic mechanism of social control which regulates the affairs of the society and resolves conflicts arising among its component groups. In the words of Gluckman (1954a), "the most important among these mechanisms are 'the inherent tendencies of groups to segment and then to become bound together by cross-cutting alliances.'" The general assumption is that most of these mechanisms are in one way or another common to all primitive societies-whether "segmentary," centralized or some other. This approach poses the problem of the conditions under which various regulatory mechanisms operate, either through specialized roles and organizations, or through specialized roles and organizations devoted mainly to the performance of regulatory tasks. Also implicit in some of these studies is the question of which area of life (economic, ritual, and so forth) makes such regulation most important and necessary. Hoebel's work on primitive law touches on these problems, mainly from the standpoint of the development of legal institutions. The studies summarized above have laid the foundations for the comparative study of primitive political institutions, but they are inadequate in several ways. First, there has been little comparative work using the criteria of comparison offered; second, some of these criteria have not been sufficiently systematic, as shown by Smith (1956); third, there has been too great an emphasis on the groups which perform governmental functions rather than on the functions themselves and an inadequate differentiation between various types of governmental functions; and fourth, there have been few attempts to relate the organization of various political functions to the aspects of the social organization.[Source: S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis", in <i>American Anthropologist</i>, 1959, 61(2):200-220] Does the study acknowledge Durkheim's work on segmentary political system?</p>
---	-------	-------------------------	--

8	24112	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q08	<p>Despite the abundance of material, there have been few systematic works on comparative political systems of primitive societies. In the available literature, two main approaches are discerned. The first, best exemplified by <i>African Political Systems</i> (Fortes and Evans 1940), is to differentiate between the "stateless," so-called segmentary societies and societies with centralized governmental and political organizations. Aidan W. Southall's famous monograph <i>Alur Society</i> not only quoted Durkheim's definition of "segmentary" but also developed his own conception of "segmentary structure" and "segmentary system". The second approach to the study of comparative primitive political institutions is exemplified in the works of Colson (1954), Gluckman (1954a) and Peristiany (1954); from a somewhat different point of view, Hoebel (1954). While most of these works deal with one tribe or society, they provide, either explicitly or by implication, possible comparative applications. Their main concern has been to show that in all primitive societies – ranging from small bands of hunters or fishermen to kingdoms such as those of Zulu, Swazi, and Dinka – there exists some basic mechanism of social control which regulates the affairs of the society and resolves conflicts arising among its component groups. In the words of Gluckman (1954), "the most important among these mechanisms are 'the inherent tendencies of groups to remain segment and then to become bound together by cross-cutting alliances.'" The general assumption is that most of these mechanisms are in one way or another common to all primitive societies-whether "segmentary," centralized or some other. This approach poses the problem of the conditions under which various regulatory mechanisms operate, either through any specialized roles and organizations, or through specialized roles and organizations devoted mainly to the performance of regulatory tasks. Also implicit in some of these studies is the question of which area of life (economic, ritual, and so forth) makes such regulation most important and necessary. Hoebel's work on primitive law touches on these problems, mainly from the standpoint of the development of legal institutions. The studies summarized above have laid the foundations for the comparative study of primitive political institutions, but they are inadequate in several ways. First, there has been little comparative work using the criteria of comparison offered; second, some of these criteria have not been sufficiently systematic, as shown by Smith (1956); third, there has been too great an emphasis on the groups which perform governmental functions rather than on the functions themselves and an inadequate differentiation between various types of governmental functions; and fourth, there have been few attempts to relate the organization of various political functions to the aspects of the social organization. [Source: S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems"]</p>
---	-------	------------------------	--

			<p>Preliminary Comparative Analysis", in <i>American Anthropologist</i>, 1959, 61(2):200-220.] Comparative studies on African political systems show that:</p>
--	--	--	--

9	24113	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q09	<p>Despite the abundance of material, there have been few systematic works on comparative political systems of primitive societies. In the available literature, two main approaches are discerned. The first, best exemplified by <i>African Political Systems</i> (Fortes and Evans 1940), is to differentiate between the "stateless," so-called segmentary societies and societies with centralized governmental and political organizations. Aidan W. Southall's famous monograph <i>Alur Society</i> not only quoted Durkheim's definition of "segmentary" but also developed his own conception of "segmentary structure" and "segmentary system". The second approach to the study of comparative primitive political institutions is exemplified in the works of Colson (1954), Gluckman (1954a) and Peristiany (1954); from a somewhat different point of view, Hoebel (1954). While most of these works deal with one tribe or society, they provide, either explicitly or by implication, possible comparative applications. Their main concern has been to show that in all primitive societies – ranging from small bands of hunters or fishermen to kingdoms such as those of Zulu, Swazi, and Dinka – there exists some basic mechanism of social control which regulates the affairs of the society and resolves conflicts arising among its component groups. In the words of Gluckman (1954a), "the most important among these mechanisms are 'the inherent tendencies of groups to segment and then to become bound together by cross-cutting alliances.'" The general assumption is that most of these mechanisms are in one way or another common to all primitive societies-whether "segmentary," centralized or some other. This approach poses the problem of the conditions under which various regulatory mechanisms operate, either through any specialized roles and organizations, or through specialized roles and organizations devoted mainly to the performance of regulatory tasks. Also implicit in some of these studies is the question of which area of life (economic, ritual, and so forth) makes such regulation most important and necessary. Hoebel's work on primitive law touches on these problems, mainly from the standpoint of the development of legal institutions. The studies summarized above have laid the foundations for the comparative study of primitive political institutions, but they are inadequate in several ways. First, there has been little comparative work using the criteria of comparison offered; second, some of these criteria have not been sufficiently systematic, as shown by Smith (1956); third, there has been too great an emphasis on the groups which perform governmental functions rather than on the functions themselves and an inadequate differentiation between various types of governmental functions; and fourth, there have been few attempts to relate the organization of various political functions to the aspects of the social organization.[Source: S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems"]</p>
---	-------	------------------------	---

			<p>Preliminary Comparative Analysis", in <i>American Anthropologist</i>, 1959, 61(2):200-220 respects are comparative studies on African political systems inadequate?</p>
--	--	--	--

10	24114	DU_J19_MPHIL_SO CIO_Q10	<p>Despite the abundance of material, there have been few systematic works on comparative political systems of primitive societies. In the available literature, two main approaches are discerned. The first, best exemplified by <i>African Political Systems</i> (Fortes and Evans 1940), is to differentiate between the "stateless," so-called segmentary societies and societies with centralized governmental and political organizations. Aidan W. Southall's famous monograph <i>Alur Society</i> not only quoted Durkheim's definition of "segmentary" but also developed his own conception of "segmentary structure" and "segmentary system". The second approach to the study of comparative primitive political institutions is exemplified in the works of Colson (1954), Gluckman (1954a) and Peristiany (1954); from a somewhat different point of view, Hoebel (1954). While most of these works deal with one tribe or society, they provide, either explicitly or by implication, possible comparative applications. Their main concern has been to show that in all primitive societies – ranging from small bands of hunters or fishermen to kingdoms such as those of Zulu, Swazi, and Dinka – there exists some basic mechanism of social control which regulates the affairs of the society and resolves conflicts arising among its component groups. In the words of Gluckman (1954a), "the most important among these mechanisms are 'the inherent tendencies of groups to remain segment and then to become bound together by cross-cutting alliances.'" The general assumption is that most of these mechanisms are in one way or another common to all primitive societies-whether "segmentary," centralized or some other. This approach poses the problem of the conditions under which various regulatory mechanisms operate, either through any specialized roles and organizations, or through specialized roles and organizations devoted mainly to the performance of regulatory tasks. Also implicit in some of these studies is the question of which area of life (economic, ritual, and so forth) makes such regulation most important and necessary. Hoebel's work on primitive law touches on these problems, mainly from the standpoint of the development of legal institutions. The studies summarized above have laid the foundations for the comparative study of primitive political institutions, but they are inadequate in several ways. First, there has been little comparative work using the criteria of comparison offered; second, some of these criteria have not been sufficiently systematic, as shown by Smith (1956); third, there has been too great an emphasis on the groups which perform governmental functions rather than on the functions themselves and an inadequate differentiation between various types of governmental functions; and fourth, there have been few attempts to relate the organization of various political functions to the aspects of the social organization.[Source: S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems"]</p>
----	-------	----------------------------	--

Preliminary Comparative Analysis", in *American Anthropologist*, 1959, 61(2):200-220.  
second approach to the study of comparative political systems, the problem is that...

firstranker.com

11	24116	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q11	<p>These nuclear households remain firmly invested in matrilineal ideology. Although state efforts to prop up men as breadwinners and heads of households are well known to rural Minangkabau, husbands do not assert claims to their wives' land nor to land that is reaped through joint effort. Nor do they articulate a right to the new houses that they help build with their earned income. People in the village maintain that a new house belongs to the wife and daughter, whether or not a husband/father's income helped to build it. In addition, a wife has a right to her husband's income but the husband does not have the same right in his wife's income. In sum, women claim rights both to jointly built houses and to land that was built with husband's help. Some of these new houses may even become matrihouses in time if a married daughter stays at home to raise her family. These claims to houses and land help to reconstitute matrilineality by incorporating new small houses and new resources into the matrilineage. Although in a few individual cases a husband provides the majority of household income, the control he thereby gains operates within a matrilineal ideology that empowers women to appropriate land and resources to their matriline. Even if a father passes on land purchased to a daughter, this inheritance practice does not instantiate patrilineality because the daughter keeps such land for her matriline. State efforts to establish husbands in the role of household heads conveniently ignore local relations without subverting women's control over houses and land. Matrilineal ideology provides the foundation for household relations, and men use this ideology to configure new houses to their advantage. [Source: Evelyn Blackwood, 1999. Big Houses and Small Houses: Doing Matrilineality in West Sumatra, <i>Ethnos</i> 64(1): 1-20.]</p> <p>married daughter may stay in her mother's house:</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	--

--	--	--	--	--



12	24117	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q12	<p>These nuclear households remain firmly invested in matrilineal ideology. Although state efforts to prop up men as breadwinners and heads of households are well known to rural Minangkabau, husbands do not assert claims to their wives' land nor to land that is reaped through joint effort. Nor do they articulate a right to the new houses that they help build with their earned income. People in the village maintain that a new house belongs to the wife and daughter, whether or not a husband/father's income helped to build it. In addition, a wife has no right to her husband's income but the husband does not have the same right in his wife's income. In sum, women claim rights both to jointly built houses and to land that was built with husband's help. Some of these new houses may even become matrihouses in the future if a married daughter stays at home to raise her family. These claims to houses and land help to reconstitute matrilineality by incorporating new small houses and new resources into the matrilineage. Although in a few individual cases a husband provides the majority of household income, the control he thereby gains operates within a matrilineal ideology that empowers women to appropriate land and resources to their matriline. Even if a father passes on land purchased to a daughter, this inheritance practice does not instantiate patrilineality because the daughter keeps such land for her matriline. State efforts to establish husbands in the role of household heads conveniently ignore local relations without subverting women's control over houses and land. Matrilineal ideology provides the foundation for household relations, and women use this ideology to configure new houses to their advantage. [Source: Evelyn Blackwood, 1999. Big Houses and Small Houses: Doing Matrilineality in West Sumatra, <i>Ethnos</i> 64(1): 35-56.] The creation of nuclear households among the Minangkabau:</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	--



firstranker.com



13	24118	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q13	<p>These nuclear households remain firmly invested in matrilineal ideology. Although state efforts to prop up men as breadwinners and heads of households are well known to rural Minangkabau, husbands do not assert claims to their wives' land nor to land that is reaped through joint effort. Nor do they articulate a right to the new houses that they help build with their earned income. People in the village maintain that a new house belongs to the wife and daughter, whether or not a husband/father's income helped to build it. In addition, a wife has a right to her husband's income but the husband does not have the same right in his wife's income. In sum, women claim rights both to jointly built houses and to land that was built with husband's help. Some of these new houses may even become matrihouses in time if a married daughter stays at home to raise her family. These claims to houses and land help to reinstantiate matrilineality by incorporating new small houses and new resources into the matrilineage. Although in a few individual cases a husband provides the majority of the income, the control he thereby gains operates within a matrilineal ideology that empowers women to appropriate land and resources to their matriline. Even if a father passes on land purchased to a daughter, this inheritance practice does not instantiate patrilineality because the daughter keeps such land for her matriline. State efforts to establish husbands in the role of household heads conveniently ignore local relations without subverting women's control over houses and land. Matrilineal ideology provides the foundation for household relations, and men use this ideology to configure new houses to their advantage. [Source: Evelyn Blackwood, 1999. Big Houses and Small Houses: Doing Matrilineality in West Sumatra, <i>Ethnos</i> 64(1): 56.] New houses that men may help build:</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---



--	--	--	--	--

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

14	24119	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q14	<p>These nuclear households remain firmly invested in matrilineal ideology. Although sta to prop up men as breadwinners and heads of households are well known to rural Minangkabau, husbands do not assert claims to their wives' land nor to land that is re through joint effort. Nor do they articulate a right to the new houses that they help b their earned income. People in the village maintain that a new house belongs to the v daughter, whether or not a husband/father's income helped to build it. In addition, a right to her husband's income but the husband does not have the same right in his w income. In sum, women claim rights both to jointly built houses and to land that was with husband's help. Some of these new houses may even become matrihouses in th a married daughter stays at home to raise her family. These claims to houses and lan reconstitute matrilineality by incorporating new small houses and new resources into matrilineage. Although in a few individual cases a husband provides the majority of h income, the control he thereby gains operates within a matrilineal ideology that emp women to appropriate land and resources to their matriline. Even if a father passes o purchased to a daughter, this inheritance practice does not instantiate patrilineality b daughter keeps such land for her matriline. State efforts to establish husbands in the of household heads conveniently ignore local relations without subverting women's co houses and land. Matrilineal ideology provides the foundation for household relations; use this ideology to configure new houses to their advantage. [Source: Evelyn Blackw 1999. Big Houses and Small Houses: Doing Matriline in West Sumatra, <i>Ethnos</i> 64(1): 56.] Women claiming rights to both jointly built houses and land gained with their hu help indicates:</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	--

--	--	--	--	--



15	24120	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q15	<p>These nuclear households remain firmly invested in matrilineal ideology. Although state efforts to prop up men as breadwinners and heads of households are well known to rural Minangkabau, husbands do not assert claims to their wives' land nor to land that is reaped through joint effort. Nor do they articulate a right to the new houses that they help build with their earned income. People in the village maintain that a new house belongs to the wife and daughter, whether or not a husband/father's income helped to build it. In addition, a wife has a right to her husband's income but the husband does not have the same right in his wife's income. In sum, women claim rights both to jointly built houses and to land that was built with husband's help. Some of these new houses may even become matrihouses in time if a married daughter stays at home to raise her family. These claims to houses and land help to reinstantiate matrilineality by incorporating new small houses and new resources into the matrilineage. Although in a few individual cases a husband provides the majority of the income, the control he thereby gains operates within a matrilineal ideology that empowers women to appropriate land and resources to their matriline. Even if a father passes on land purchased to a daughter, this inheritance practice does not instantiate patrilineality because the daughter keeps such land for her matriline. State efforts to establish husbands in the role of household heads conveniently ignore local relations without subverting women's control over houses and land. Matrilineal ideology provides the foundation for household relations; husbands use this ideology to configure new houses to their advantage. [Source: Evelyn Blackwood, 1999. Big Houses and Small Houses: Doing Matrilineality in West Sumatra, <i>Ethnos</i> 64(1): 35-56.] In the light of the above passage, which one of the following statements is true?</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---



firstranker.com

--	--	--	--	--

16	24122	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q16	<p>The Soviet system produced tremendous suffering, repression, fear, and lack of freedom which are well documented. But focusing only on that side of the system will not take us far if we want to answer the question posed by this book about the internal paradoxes under socialism. What tends to get lost in the binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact that, for great numbers of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals, and realities of socialist life (such as equality, community, selflessness, altruism, friendship, ethical relations, safety, education, work, creativity, and concern for the future) were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain norms and rules represented in the official ideology of the socialist state. For many, "socialism" as a system of human values and the everyday reality of "normal life" (normal'naia zhizn') was not necessarily equivalent to the state or "ideology"; indeed, living socialism to them often meant something quite different from the official interpretations provided by state rhetoric. An undeniable constitutive part of today's phenomenon of "post-Soviet nostalgia," which is a complex post-Soviet constellation of the longing for the very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism afforded—often in spite of the state's proclaimed goals—and that as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the feelings of dullness and alienation. ...Without understanding the ethical and aesthetic paradoxes that "really existing socialism" acquired in the lives of many of its citizens, and without understanding the contradictions and positive meanings with which they endowed their socialist lives—sometimes in line with the announced goals of the state, sometimes in spite of them, and sometimes relating to them in ways that did not fit either-or dichotomies—we would fail to understand what kind of system socialism was and why its sudden transformation was so unimaginable and yet so unsurprising to the people living within it. [Source: Alexei Yurchak, 2005. <i>Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More</i>, New Jersey: Princeton University Press] According to this passage, which of the following features of the Soviet system are relatively unknown?</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	--

firstranker.com

17	24123	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q17	<p>The Soviet system produced tremendous suffering, repression, fear, and lack of freedom which are well documented. But focusing only on that side of the system will not take us far if we want to answer the question posed by this book about the internal paradoxes under socialism. What tends to get lost in the binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact that, for great numbers of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals, and realities of socialist life (such as equality, community, selflessness, altruism, friendship, ethical relations, safety, education, work, creativity, and concern for the future) were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain norms and rules represented in the official ideology of the socialist state. For many, "socialism" as a system of human values and the everyday reality of "normal life" (normal'naia zhizn') was not necessarily equivalent to the state or "ideology"; indeed, living socialism to them often meant something quite different from the official interpretations provided by state rhetoric. An undeniable constitutive part of today's phenomenon of "post-Soviet nostalgia," which is a complex post-Soviet constellation of the longing for the very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism afforded—often in spite of the state's proclaimed goals—and that as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the feelings of dullness and alienation. ...Without understanding the ethical and aesthetic paradoxes that "really existing socialism" acquired in the lives of many of its citizens, and without understanding the contradictions and positive meanings with which they endowed their socialist lives—sometimes in line with the announced goals of the state, sometimes in spite of them, and sometimes relating to them in ways that did not fit either-or dichotomies—we would fail to understand what kind of system socialism was and why its sudden transformation was so unimaginable and yet so unsurprising to the people living within it. [Source: Alexei Yurchak, 2005. <i>Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More</i>, New Jersey: Princeton University Press] The human values that underlay 'really existing socialism' were:</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---

firstRanker.com

18	24124	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q18	<p>The Soviet system produced tremendous suffering, repression, fear, and lack of freedom which are well documented. But focusing only on that side of the system will not take us far if we want to answer the question posed by this book about the internal paradoxes under socialism. What tends to get lost in the binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact that, for great numbers of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals, and realities of socialist life (such as equality, community, selflessness, altruism, friendship, ethical relations, safety, education, work, creativity, and concern for the future) were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain norms and rules represented in the official ideology of the socialist state. For many, "socialism" as a system of human values and the everyday reality of "normal life" (normal'naia zhizn') was not necessarily equivalent to the state or "ideology"; indeed, living socialism to them often meant something quite different from the official interpretations provided by state rhetoric. An undeniable constitutive part of today's phenomenon of "post-Soviet nostalgia," which is a complex post-Soviet constellation of the longing for the very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism afforded—often in spite of the state's proclaimed goals—and that as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the feelings of dullness and alienation. ...Without understanding the ethical and aesthetic paradoxes that "really existing socialism" acquired in the lives of many of its citizens, and without understanding the contradictions and positive meanings with which they endowed their socialist lives—sometimes in line with the announced goals of the state, sometimes in spite of them, and sometimes relating to them in ways that did not fit either-or dichotomies—we would fail to understand what kind of system socialism was and why its sudden transformation was so unimaginable and yet so unsurprising to the people living within it. [Source: Alexei Yurchak, 2005. <i>Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More</i>, New Jersey: Princeton University Press] According to this passage, post-Soviet nostalgia is a longing for:</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---

firstranker.com

19	24125	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q19	<p>The Soviet system produced tremendous suffering, repression, fear, and lack of freedom which are well documented. But focusing only on that side of the system will not take us far if we want to answer the question posed by this book about the internal paradoxes under socialism. What tends to get lost in the binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact that, for great numbers of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals, and realities of socialist life (such as equality, community, selflessness, altruism, friendship, ethical relations, safety, education, work, creativity, and concern for the future) were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain norms and rules represented in the official ideology of the socialist state. For many, "socialism" as a system of human values and the everyday reality of "normal life" (normal'naia zhizn') was not necessarily equivalent to the state or "ideology"; indeed, living socialism to them often meant something quite different from the official interpretations provided by state rhetoric. An undeniable constitutive part of today's phenomenon of "post-Soviet nostalgia," which is a complex post-Soviet constellation of the longing for the very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism afforded—often in spite of the state's proclaimed goals—and that as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the feelings of dullness and alienation. ...Without understanding the ethical and aesthetic paradoxes that "really existing socialism" acquired in the lives of many of its citizens, and without understanding the contradictions and positive meanings with which they endowed their socialist lives—sometimes in line with the announced goals of the state, sometimes in spite of them, and sometimes relating to them in ways that did not fit either-or dichotomies—we would fail to understand what kind of system socialism was and why its sudden transformation was so unimaginable and yet so unsurprising to the people living within it. [Source: Alexei Yurchak, 2005. <i>Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More</i>, New Jersey: Princeton University Press] Humanist and socialist values had the following relationship with state ideology</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---

firstranker.com



20	24126	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q20	<p>The Soviet system produced tremendous suffering, repression, fear, and lack of freedom which are well documented. But focusing only on that side of the system will not take us far if we want to answer the question posed by this book about the internal paradoxes under socialism. What tends to get lost in the binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact that, for great numbers of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals, and realities of socialist life (such as equality, community, selflessness, altruism, friendship, ethical relations, safety, education, work, creativity, and concern for the future) were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain norms and rules represented in the official ideology of the socialist state. For many, "socialism" as a system of human values and the everyday reality of "normal life" (normal'naia zhizn') was not necessarily equivalent to the state or "ideology"; indeed, living socialism to them often meant something quite different from the official interpretations provided by state rhetoric. An undeniable constitutive part of today's phenomenon of "post-Soviet nostalgia," which is a complex post-Soviet constellation of the longing for the very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism afforded—often in spite of the state's proclaimed goals—and that as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the feelings of dullness and alienation. ...Without understanding the ethical and aesthetic paradoxes that "really existing socialism" acquired in the lives of many of its citizens, and without understanding the contradictions and positive meanings with which they endowed their socialist lives—sometimes in line with the announced goals of the state, sometimes in spite of them, and sometimes relating to them in ways that did not fit either-or dichotomies—we would fail to understand what kind of system socialism was and why its sudden transformation was so unimaginable and yet so unsurprising to the people living within it. [Source: Alexei Yurchak, 2005. <i>Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More</i>, New Jersey: Princeton University Press] According to this passage, which of the following were found in 'really existing socialism'? I. Humane values II. repression III. A society free of contradictions IV. Ethical and aesthetic paradoxes V. Dullness and alienation</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	--

21	25883	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q21_ New	<p>Dead bodies are material things that bear a referential relationship to an absent subject. They are in this sense a kind of medium, connecting the living to the memory of a deceased person. In such, they are the perfect starting point to what Bill Brown has termed a "materialist poetics of media." The corpse is a material thing freighted with the most intense cultural meaning. A look at death practices from the starting point of the corpse is thus to inquire precisely about the relationship between the material and the textual, between the thing itself and the representation of it, of representational texts required to make sense of it, to venture between the world of the living and cultural and historical practice, and the universality of death. A materialist analysis of death begins with the corpse because the corpse is itself a complex figure of mediation. For the corpse is precisely not a material object among others. It is a special kind of thing whose physical existence is a matter of no small cultural significance—and whose discursive meaning is inseparable from its materiality. The corpse combines the organic material of the body with the symbolic power of death. The corpse is, on the one hand, a material thing, subject to the laws of biology and physics. It has weight and heft; it will decompose at a certain rate under certain physical conditions; it responds to moisture and heat, and so on. On the other hand, its material properties provoke horror, as we all fear death and flinch at the thought of corpses. Nevertheless, because this powerful symbolism rests precisely upon the corporeality of the dead flesh, its meaning is not reducible to mere cultural effect. It is the corpse as thing that commands such powerful symbolic efficacy. It frightens because it is vulnerable and passive—because it scares us to imagine our own bodies as subject to the biological imperatives of decomposition. Corpses depend on the living to treat them with respect and dignity, to guide them carefully into some kind of not being there. The corpse is thus a powerfully suggestive cultural text and an incontrovertibly material object. [Source: M. Schwartz, 2013. "An Iconography of the Flesh: How Corpses Mean As Matter," <i>communication +1</i> : Vol. 2(1).] Which of the following statements can be inferred from the above passage?</p>

firstranker.com

--	--	--	--	--

22	25884	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q22_ New	<p>Dead bodies are material things that bear a referential relationship to an absent subject. They are in this sense a kind of medium, connecting the living to the memory of a deceased person. In such, they are the perfect starting point to what Bill Brown has termed a "materialist poetics of media." The corpse is a material thing freighted with the most intense cultural meanings. To look at death practices from the starting point of the corpse is thus to inquire precisely about the relationship between the material and the textual, between the thing itself and the rich network of representational texts required to make sense of it, to venture between the world of the living and cultural and historical practice, and the universality of death. A materialist analysis of death begins with the corpse because the corpse is itself a complex figure of mediation. For the corpse is precisely not a material object among others. It is a special kind of thing whose physical existence is a matter of no small cultural significance—and whose discursive function is inseparable from its materiality. The corpse combines the organic material of the body with the symbolic power of death. The corpse is, on the one hand, a material thing, subject to the laws of biology and physics. It has weight and heft; it will decompose at a certain rate under certain physical conditions; it responds to moisture and heat, and so on. On the other hand, its material properties provoke horror, as we all fear death and flinch at the thought of our own corpses. Nevertheless, because this powerful symbolism rests precisely upon the corporeality of the dead flesh, its meaning is not reducible to mere cultural effect. It is the corpse as thing that commands such powerful symbolic efficacy. It frightens because it is vulnerable and passive—because it scares us to imagine our own bodies as subject to the biological imperatives of decomposition. Corpses depend on the living to treat them with respect and dignity, to guide them carefully into some kind of not being there. The corpse is thus a powerfully suggestive cultural text and an incontrovertibly material object. [Source: Mark S. Schwartz, 2013. "An Iconography of the Flesh: How Corpses Mean As Matter," <i>communication +1</i> : Vol. 2(1).] Which of the following statements can be inferred from the above passage?</p>
----	-------	--	--

firstranker.com



23	25885	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q23_ New	<p>Dead bodies are material things that bear a referential relationship to an absent subject. They are in this sense a kind of medium, connecting the living to the memory of a deceased person. In such, they are the perfect starting point to what Bill Brown has termed a "materialist poetics of media." The corpse is a material thing freighted with the most intense cultural meanings. To look at death practices from the starting point of the corpse is thus to inquire precisely about the relationship between the material and the textual, between the thing itself and the rich network of representational texts required to make sense of it, to venture between the world of the living and cultural and historical practice, and the universality of death. A materialist analysis of death begins with the corpse because the corpse is itself a complex figure of mediation. For the corpse is precisely not a material object among others. It is a special kind of thing whose physical existence is a matter of no small cultural significance—and whose discursive function is inseparable from its materiality. The corpse combines the organic material of the body with the symbolic power of death. The corpse is, on the one hand, a material thing, subject to the laws of biology and physics. It has weight and heft; it will decompose at a certain rate under certain physical conditions; it responds to moisture and heat, and so on. On the other hand, its material properties provoke horror, as we all fear death and flinch at the thought of corpses. Nevertheless, because this powerful symbolism rests precisely upon the corporeality of the dead flesh, its meaning is not reducible to mere cultural effect. It is the corpse as thing that commands such powerful symbolic efficacy. It frightens because it is vulnerable and passive—because it scares us to imagine our own bodies as subject to the biological imperatives of decomposition. Corpses depend on the living to treat them with respect and dignity, to guide them carefully into some kind of not being there. The corpse is thus a powerfully suggestive cultural text and an incontrovertibly material object. [Source: Michael Schwartz, 2013. "An Iconography of the Flesh: How Corpses Mean As Matter," <i>communication +1</i> : Vol. 2(1).] Which of the following statements can be inferred from the above passage?</p>
----	-------	--	--

firstranker.com

--	--	--	--	--

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

24	25886	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q24_ New	<p>Dead bodies are material things that bear a referential relationship to an absent subject. They are in this sense a kind of medium, connecting the living to the memory of a deceased person. In such, they are the perfect starting point to what Bill Brown has termed a "materialist poetics of media." The corpse is a material thing freighted with the most intense cultural meanings. To look at death practices from the starting point of the corpse is thus to inquire precisely about the relationship between the material and the textual, between the thing itself and the rich network of representational texts required to make sense of it, to venture between the world of the living and cultural and historical practice, and the universality of death. A materialist analysis of death begins with the corpse because the corpse is itself a complex figure of mediation. For the corpse is precisely not a material object among others. It is a special kind of thing whose physical existence is a matter of no small cultural significance—and whose discursive function is inseparable from its materiality. The corpse combines the organic material of the body with the symbolic power of death. The corpse is, on the one hand, a material thing, subject to the laws of biology and physics. It has weight and heft; it will decompose at a certain rate under certain physical conditions; it responds to moisture and heat, and so on. On the other hand, its material properties provoke horror, as we all fear death and flinch at the thought of our own corpses. Nevertheless, because this powerful symbolism rests precisely upon the corporeality of the dead flesh, its meaning is not reducible to mere cultural effect. It is the corpse as thing that commands such powerful symbolic efficacy. It frightens because it is vulnerable and passive—because it scares us to imagine our own bodies as subject to the biological imperatives of decomposition. Corpses depend on the living to treat them with respect and dignity, to guide them carefully into some kind of not being there. The corpse is thus a powerfully suggestive cultural text and an incontrovertibly material object. [Source: Mark S. Schwartz, 2013. "An Iconography of the Flesh: How Corpses Mean As Matter," <i>communication +1</i> : Vol. 2(1).] Which of the following statements can be inferred from the above passage?</p>
----	-------	--	--

firstranker.com

--	--	--	--

25	25887	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q25_ New	<p>Dead bodies are material things that bear a referential relationship to an absent subject. They are in this sense a kind of medium, connecting the living to the memory of a deceased person. In such, they are the perfect starting point to what Bill Brown has termed a "materialist poetics of media." The corpse is a material thing freighted with the most intense cultural meanings. To look at death practices from the starting point of the corpse is thus to inquire precisely about the relationship between the material and the textual, between the thing itself and the rich network of representational texts required to make sense of it, to venture between the world of the living and cultural and historical practice, and the universality of death. A materialist analysis of death begins with the corpse because the corpse is itself a complex figure of mediation. For the corpse is precisely not a material object among others. It is a special kind of thing whose physical existence is a matter of no small cultural significance—and whose discursive function is inseparable from its materiality. The corpse combines the organic material of the body with the symbolic power of death. The corpse is, on the one hand, a material thing, subject to the laws of biology and physics. It has weight and heft; it will decompose at a certain rate under certain physical conditions; it responds to moisture and heat, and so on. On the other hand, its material properties provoke horror, as we all fear death and flinch at the thought of corpses. Nevertheless, because this powerful symbolism rests precisely upon the corporeality of the dead flesh, its meaning is not reducible to mere cultural effect. It is the corpse as thing that commands such powerful symbolic efficacy. It frightens because it is vulnerable and passive—because it scares us to imagine our own bodies as subject to the biological imperatives of decomposition. Corpses depend on the living to treat them with respect and dignity, to guide them carefully into some kind of not being there. The corpse is thus a powerfully suggestive cultural text and an incontrovertibly material object. [Source: Mark S. Schwartz, 2013. "An Iconography of the Flesh: How Corpses Mean As Matter," <i>communication +1</i> : Vol. 2(1).] Which of the following statements can be inferred from the above passage?</p>
----	-------	--	--

firstranker.com

--	--	--	--	--

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

26	24140	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q26	<p>Patriotic emotion seeks devotion and allegiance through a colourful story of the nation which points, typically, to a future that still lies in doubt. Indeed, the idea of a nation is very nature, a narrative construct. To say what a given nation is to select from all the unordered material of the past and present a story line that emphasizes some things over others, all in the service of pointing to what the future may hold— if people dedicate themselves sufficiently. French philosopher Ernst Renan influentially and convincingly that a nation is not simply a physical location; it is an idea, a "spiritual principle." This principle involves, on the one hand, a story of the past, usually a story of adversity and suffering, and then a commitment to the future, a willingness to live together and face adversities for the sake of common goals. The two sides are linked, because the story of the past has to tell people what is worth fighting for in the future. Renan remarks that there to have in it something great or glorious, but it also needs to have loss and suffering: "national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort." ...in Renan's words, "One loves in proportion to the sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one has suffered." Following Batson, we may add that a good story of a nation's past will involve not only ideals, but also particular individuals; not only a conceptual space, but also physical places. The need for emotions of loving concern becomes even more apparent, and their contours are clearly demarcated, when we consider the threat posed to morality by disgust. Disgust jeopardizes national projects involving altruistic sacrifice for a common good, for it divides the nation into hierarchically ordered groups that must not meet. What "common good" could those lines? Given that separations motivated by disgust are so common in real societies, societies need to find ways to surmount this problem. ... Given that the other has already been vividly depicted in one way, as subhuman, the antidote to that way of imagining must come via the imagination, in the form of experiences of seeing the other as fully human. [Source: Martha Nussbaum, 2013. <i>Political Emotions - Why Love Matters for Justice</i>. Boston: Harvard University Press.] The spiritual principle of the nation involves</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	--

--	--	--	--	--

firstRanker.com  
www.FirstRanker.com

27	24141	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q27	<p>Patriotic emotion seeks devotion and allegiance through a colourful story of the nation which points, typically, to a future that still lies in doubt. Indeed, the idea of a nation is very nature, a narrative construct. To say what a given nation is is to select from all the unordered material of the past and present a story line that emphasizes some things over others, all in the service of pointing to what the future may hold— if people dedicate themselves sufficiently. French philosopher Ernst Renan influentially and convincingly argued that a nation is not simply a physical location; it is an idea, a "spiritual principle." This principle involves, on the one hand, a story of the past, usually a story of adversity and suffering, and then a commitment to the future, a willingness to live together and face adversities for the sake of common goals. The two sides are linked, because the story of the past has to tell people what is worth fighting for in the future. Renan remarks that there to have in it something great or glorious, but it also needs to have loss and suffering: "national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort." ...in Renan's words, "One loves in proportion to the sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one has suffered." Following Batson, we may add that a good story of a nation's past will involve not only ideals, but also particular individuals; not only a conceptual space, but also physical places. The need for emotions of loving concern becomes even more apparent, and their contours are clearly demarcated, when we consider the threat posed to morality by disgust. Disgust jeopardizes national projects involving altruistic sacrifice for a common good, for it divides a nation into hierarchically ordered groups that must not meet. What "common good" can those lines? Given that separations motivated by disgust are so common in real societies, societies need to find ways to surmount this problem. ... Given that the other has already been vividly depicted in one way, as subhuman, the antidote to that way of imagining must come via the imagination, in the form of experiences of seeing the other as fully human. [Source: Martha Nussbaum, 2013. <i>Political Emotions - Why Love Matters for Justice</i>. Boston:Harvard University Press.] Defining a given nation requires:</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	--

firstranker.com

28	24142	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q28	<p>Patriotic emotion seeks devotion and allegiance through a colourful story of the nation which points, typically, to a future that still lies in doubt. Indeed, the idea of a nation is very nature, a narrative construct. To say what a given nation is is to select from all the unordered material of the past and present a story line that emphasizes some things over others, all in the service of pointing to what the future may hold— if people dedicate themselves sufficiently. French philosopher Ernst Renan influentially and convincingly argued that a nation is not simply a physical location; it is an idea, a "spiritual principle." This principle involves, on the one hand, a story of the past, usually a story of adversity and suffering, and then a commitment to the future, a willingness to live together and face adversities for the sake of common goals. The two sides are linked, because the story of the past has to tell people what is worth fighting for in the future. Renan remarks that the nation to have in it something great or glorious, but it also needs to have loss and suffering: "national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort." ...in Renan's words, "One loves in proportion to the sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one has suffered." Following Batson, we may add that a good story of a nation's past will involve not only grand ideals, but also particular individuals; not only a conceptual space, but also physical places. The need for emotions of loving concern becomes even more apparent, and their contours become clearly demarcated, when we consider the threat posed to morality by disgust. Disgust jeopardizes national projects involving altruistic sacrifice for a common good, for it divides the nation into hierarchically ordered groups that must not meet. What "common good" can cross those lines? Given that separations motivated by disgust are so common in real societies, societies need to find ways to surmount this problem. ... Given that the other has already been vividly depicted in one way, as subhuman, the antidote to that way of imagining must come via the imagination, in the form of experiences of seeing the other as fully human. [Source: Martha Nussbaum, 2013. <i>Political Emotions - Why Love Matters for Justice</i>. Boston: Harvard University Press.] The passage suggests that love for the nation is most likely to be:</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---

firstranker.com

--	--	--	--	--



29	24143	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q29	<p>Patriotic emotion seeks devotion and allegiance through a colourful story of the nation which points, typically, to a future that still lies in doubt. Indeed, the idea of a nation is very nature, a narrative construct. To say what a given nation is is to select from all the unordered material of the past and present a story line that emphasizes some things over others, all in the service of pointing to what the future may hold— if people dedicate themselves sufficiently. French philosopher Ernst Renan influentially and convincingly argued that a nation is not simply a physical location; it is an idea, a "spiritual principle." This principle involves, on the one hand, a story of the past, usually a story of adversity and suffering, and then a commitment to the future, a willingness to live together and face adversities for the sake of common goals. The two sides are linked, because the story of the past has to tell people what is worth fighting for in the future. Renan remarks that the nation to have in it something great or glorious, but it also needs to have loss and suffering: "national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort." ...in Renan's words, "One loves in proportion to the sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one has suffered." Following Batson, we may add that a good story of a nation's past will involve not only grand ideals, but also particular individuals; not only a conceptual space, but also physical places. The need for emotions of loving concern becomes even more apparent, and their contours become clearly demarcated, when we consider the threat posed to morality by disgust. Disgust jeopardizes national projects involving altruistic sacrifice for a common good, for it divides the nation into hierarchically ordered groups that must not meet. What "common good" can cross those lines? Given that separations motivated by disgust are so common in real societies, societies need to find ways to surmount this problem. ... Given that the other has already been vividly depicted in one way, as subhuman, the antidote to that way of imagining must come via the imagination, in the form of experiences of seeing the other as fully human. [Source: Martha Nussbaum, 2013. <i>Political Emotions - Why Love Matters for Justice</i>. Boston: Harvard University Press.] National projects of altruistic sacrifices are threatened by:</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---



firstranker.com

30	24144	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q30	<p>Patriotic emotion seeks devotion and allegiance through a colourful story of the nation which points, typically, to a future that still lies in doubt. Indeed, the idea of a nation is very nature, a narrative construct. To say what a given nation is is to select from all the unordered material of the past and present a story line that emphasizes some things over others, all in the service of pointing to what the future may hold— if people dedicate themselves sufficiently. French philosopher Ernst Renan influentially and convincingly argued that a nation is not simply a physical location; it is an idea, a "spiritual principle." This principle involves, on the one hand, a story of the past, usually a story of adversity and suffering, and then a commitment to the future, a willingness to live together and face adversities for the sake of common goals. The two sides are linked, because the story of the past has to tell people what is worth fighting for in the future. Renan remarks that the nation to have in it something great or glorious, but it also needs to have loss and suffering: "national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort." ...in Renan's words, "One loves in proportion to the sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one has suffered." Following Batson, we may add that a good story of a nation's past will involve not only ideals, but also particular individuals; not only a conceptual space, but also physical places. The need for emotions of loving concern becomes even more apparent, and their contours become clearly demarcated, when we consider the threat posed to morality by disgust. Disgust jeopardizes national projects involving altruistic sacrifice for a common good, for it divides the nation into hierarchically ordered groups that must not meet. What "common good" can exist on those lines? Given that separations motivated by disgust are so common in real societies, societies need to find ways to surmount this problem. ... Given that the other has already been vividly depicted in one way, as subhuman, the antidote to that way of imagining must come via the imagination, in the form of experiences of seeing the other as fully human. [Source: Martha Nussbaum, 2013. <i>Political Emotions - Why Love Matters for Justice</i>. Boston: Harvard University Press.] The passage suggests that social separations motivated by disgust are common and have to be surmounted by:</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---

--	--	--	--

31	24146	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q31	<p>"Many years before," Mheme Lama related, "when people would die, the body would disappear along with the soul, and people would cry and get very upset. ... the body would vanish like 'phet'! Then the family of the dead man would cry and search for his body ... they would say, 'Where is he?! Where has he gone?!' " "Before, the body would disappear as well?" as Nogapu Sherpa. "Yes," Mheme said. "But then the deities said, 'This is no good,' and they decided that the people must be able to see the body. Now they make the body stay. The body remains, and the soul departs. When it leaves the body, the body decays. So they need to be cremated or buried. Ah, now they need to cremate the body, compose the body, and perform the funeral rites. The body can't be kept here forever, so they call the lamas and priests, to perform those rites]. And the family feels better, thinking, 'Yes, he has died. The body remains, the body is cremated, the funeral rites are performed, and people can understand that the person is dead. 'It's death' [they say]." Here vision was as much about knowledge. Mheme understood that it was important that a corpse not vanish too quickly and suddenly. A corpse is an absent presence, the vestige of a person no longer alive. Still, the lingering visual presence provides evidence of the transition from life to death, and so helps people to understand the actuality of any death. If they could not view the corpse, family members would search in despair, bewildered by the person's absence, unsure whether the person was still alive. Since a lifeless body inevitably decays, it cannot be kept forever. Yet, rather than having it vanish "like 'phet,' " as it once did, the gods arranged it so that a corpse would remain as a visible, palpable reminder of a person's death, giving bereaved family members sufficient time and the tangible, ritual means to come to terms with the death. Mheme ... brought to mind ideas of materiality and immateriality, appearances and disappearances, contact and disconnection, longing and fulfillment, remembrance and forgetting, matter and the decay of matter, the changes that time effects, the fate of sentient bodies, the life and death of things. In most of these conversations vision was the dominant sensory orientation. [Source: Robert Desjarlais, 2003. <i>Sensory Biographies</i>. Los Angeles: University of California Press.] What is the most important reason why the gods decided to leave the body behind a person behind after the soul had left it?</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	--

firstranker.com

--	--	--	--	--



32	24147	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q32	<p>"Many years before," Mheme Lama related, "when people would die, the body would ... along with the soul, and people would cry and get very upset. ... the body would vanish like 'phet'! Then the family of the dead man would cry and search for his body ... they would say, 'Where is he?! Where has he gone?!' " "Before, the body would disappear as well?" as Nogapu Sherpa. "Yes," Mheme said. "But then the deities said, 'This is no good,' and they decided that the people must be able to see the body. Now they make the body stay. The body remains, and the soul departs. When it leaves the body, the body decays. So they need to be cremated or buried. Ah, now they need to cremate the body, compose the body, perform the funeral rites. The body can't be kept here forever, so they call the lamas and priests, to perform those rites]. And the family feels better, thinking, 'Yes, he has died. The body remains, the body is cremated, the funeral rites are performed, and people can understand that the person is dead. 'It's death' [they say]." Here vision was as much knowledge. Mheme understood that it was important that a corpse not vanish too quickly and suddenly. A corpse is an absent presence, the vestige of a person no longer alive. Still, the lingering visual presence provides evidence of the transition from life to death, and so people can understand the actuality of any death. If they could not view the corpse, family members would search in despair, bewildered by the person's absence, unsure whether she was still alive. Since a lifeless body inevitably decays, it cannot be kept forever. Yet, rather than having it vanish "like 'phet,' " as it once did, the gods arranged it so that a corpse remain as a visible, palpable reminder of a person's death, giving bereaved family members sufficient time and the tangible, ritual means to come to terms with the death. Mheme ... brought to mind ideas of materiality and immateriality, appearances and disappearances, contact and disconnection, longing and fulfillment, remembrance and forgetting, matter and the decay of matter, the changes that time effects, the fate of sentient bodies, the life and death of things. In most of these conversations vision was the dominant sensory orientation. [Source: Robert Desjarlais, 2003. <i>Sensory Biographies</i>. Los Angeles: University of California Press.] The sentence: "Here vision was as much solace as knowledge" means</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	--



firstranker.com

33	24148	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q33	<p>"Many years before," Mheme Lama related, "when people would die, the body would disappear along with the soul, and people would cry and get very upset. ... the body would vanish like 'phet'! Then the family of the dead man would cry and search for his body ... they would say, 'Where is he?! Where has he gone?!' " "Before, the body would disappear as well?" as Nogapu Sherpa. "Yes," Mheme said. "But then the deities said, 'This is no good,' and they decided that the people must be able to see the body. Now they make the body stay. The body remains, and the soul departs. When it leaves the body, the body decays. So they need to be cremated or buried. Ah, now they need to cremate the body, compose the body, and perform the funeral rites. The body can't be kept here forever, so they call the lamas and priests, to perform those rites]. And the family feels better, thinking, 'Yes, he has died. The body remains, the body is cremated, the funeral rites are performed, and people can understand that the person is dead. 'It's death' [they say]." Here vision was as much about knowledge. Mheme understood that it was important that a corpse not vanish too quickly and suddenly. A corpse is an absent presence, the vestige of a person no longer alive. Still, the lingering visual presence provides evidence of the transition from life to death, and so helps people to understand the actuality of any death. If they could not view the corpse, family members would search in despair, bewildered by the person's absence, unsure whether she was still alive. Since a lifeless body inevitably decays, it cannot be kept forever. Yet, rather than having it vanish "like 'phet,' " as it once did, the gods arranged it so that a corpse would remain as a visible, palpable reminder of a person's death, giving bereaved family members sufficient time and the tangible, ritual means to come to terms with the death. Mheme ... brought to mind ideas of materiality and immateriality, appearances and disappearances, contact and disconnection, longing and fulfillment, remembrance and forgetting, matter and the decay of matter, the changes that time effects, the fate of sentient bodies, the life and death of things. In most of these conversations vision was the dominant sensory orientation. [Source: Robert Desjarlais, 2003. <i>Sensory Biographies</i>. Los Angeles: University of California Press.] What was the common theme in most of Mheme Lama's interactions with the author?</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---

firstranker.com

34	24149	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q34	<p>"Many years before," Mheme Lama related, "when people would die, the body would disappear along with the soul, and people would cry and get very upset. ... the body would vanish like 'phet'! Then the family of the dead man would cry and search for his body ... they would say, 'Where is he?! Where has he gone?!' " "Before, the body would disappear as well?" as Nogapu Sherpa. "Yes," Mheme said. "But then the deities said, 'This is no good,' and they decided that the people must be able to see the body. Now they make the body stay. The body remains, and the soul departs. When it leaves the body, the body decays. So they need to be cremated or buried. Ah, now they need to cremate the body, compose the body, perform the funeral rites. The body can't be kept here forever, so they call the lamas and priests, to perform those rites]. And the family feels better, thinking, 'Yes, he has died. The body remains, the body is cremated, the funeral rites are performed, and people can understand that the person is dead. 'It's death' [they say]." Here vision was as much about knowledge. Mheme understood that it was important that a corpse not vanish too quickly and suddenly. A corpse is an absent presence, the vestige of a person no longer alive. Still, the lingering visual presence provides evidence of the transition from life to death, and so people can understand the actuality of any death. If they could not view the corpse, family members would search in despair, bewildered by the person's absence, unsure whether she was still alive. Since a lifeless body inevitably decays, it cannot be kept forever. Yet, rather than having it vanish "like 'phet,' " as it once did, the gods arranged it so that a corpse remain as a visible, palpable reminder of a person's death, giving bereaved family members sufficient time and the tangible, ritual means to come to terms with the death. Mheme ... brought to mind ideas of materiality and immateriality, appearances and disappearances, contact and disconnection, longing and fulfillment, remembrance and forgetting, matter and the decay of matter, the changes that time effects, the fate of sentient bodies, the life and death of things. In most of these conversations vision was the dominant sensory orientation. [Source: Robert Desjarlais, 2003. <i>Sensory Biographies</i>. Los Angeles: University of California Press.] The passage suggests that knowing and seeing are related because</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---

--	--	--	--

35	24150	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q35	<p>"Many years before," Mheme Lama related, "when people would die, the body would ... along with the soul, and people would cry and get very upset. ... the body would vanish like 'phet'! Then the family of the dead man would cry and search for his body ... they would say, 'Where is he?! Where has he gone?!' " "Before, the body would disappear as well?" as Nogapu Sherpa. "Yes," Mheme said. "But then the deities said, 'This is no good,' and they decided that the people must be able to see the body. Now they make the body stay. The body remains, and the soul departs. When it leaves the body, the body decays. So they need to be cremated or buried. Ah, now they need to cremate the body, compose the body, perform the funeral rites. The body can't be kept here forever, so they call the lamas and priests, to perform those rites]. And the family feels better, thinking, 'Yes, he has died. The body remains, the body is cremated, the funeral rites are performed, and people can understand that the person is dead. 'It's death' [they say]." Here vision was as much about knowledge. Mheme understood that it was important that a corpse not vanish too quickly and suddenly. A corpse is an absent presence, the vestige of a person no longer alive. Still, the lingering visual presence provides evidence of the transition from life to death, and so people can understand the actuality of any death. If they could not view the corpse, family members would search in despair, bewildered by the person's absence, unsure whether she was still alive. Since a lifeless body inevitably decays, it cannot be kept forever. Yet, rather than having it vanish "like 'phet,' " as it once did, the gods arranged it so that a corpse remain as a visible, palpable reminder of a person's death, giving bereaved family members sufficient time and the tangible, ritual means to come to terms with the death. Mheme ... brought to mind ideas of materiality and immateriality, appearances and disappearances, contact and disconnection, longing and fulfillment, remembrance and forgetting, matter and the decay of matter, the changes that time effects, the fate of sentient bodies, the life and death of things. In most of these conversations vision was the dominant sensory orientation. [Source: Robert Desjarlais, 2003. <i>Sensory Biographies</i>. Los Angeles: University of California Press.] Death rituals are important because:</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---

firstranker.com

36	24152	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q36	<p>Increased geographical mobility, in turn, interacted with the way in which land-assignment and land-use were determined to produce more drastic changes in the identity of neighborhoods. Central authorities have always had a say in these allocative decisions, and they still do, with zoning regulations having a territorializing effect. Land-rents, on the other hand, which became sufficiently fluid to give rise to economic speculation, were a powerful deterrent force, divorcing the reasons for land-ownership from any consideration of the activities taking place in it and promoting the relatively rapid displacement of one land-use by another. Urban sociologists referred to this phenomenon as <i>land-succession</i>, after the ecological succession in which a given assemblage of plants gives way to another assemblage as an ecosystem moves towards its climax mix of vegetation. Instead of plants these sociologists were concerned with land-uses and modelled this succession as a concentric expansion away from a city's center. The core was taken over by a central business district, encircled by a zone in transition between manufacture and deteriorating residential neighbourhoods. Next came a ring of working-class neighbourhoods, followed by middle-and upper-class neighbourhoods, and finally the zone for the commuters. Those early studies, however focused on a single city (Chicago), did not give a full explanation of the mechanisms involved in succession. The concentric model seems to be valid for many cities in the USA where incomes do tend to rise with distance from a city's centre, but not for many parts of Continental Europe, where the reverse is the case. [Source: Manuel Delanda, 2006. <i>A New Philosophy of Society</i>. Assemblage The Social Complexity. London and NY: Continuum.] According to the above passage, which of the following have territorializing effects? (i) State policies and law, (ii) Market factors, (iii) Community identities, (iv) Ecological factors</p>

--	--	--	--	--

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

37	24153	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q37	<p>Increased geographical mobility, in turn, interacted with the way in which land-assignment and land-use were determined to produce more drastic changes in the identity of neighbourhoods. Central authorities have always had a say in these allocative decisions, and they still have, with zoning regulations having a territorializing effect. Land-rents, on the other hand, which became sufficiently fluid to give rise to economic speculation, were a powerful deterrent force, divorcing the reasons for land-ownership from any consideration of the activities taking place in it and promoting the relatively rapid displacement of one land-use by another. Urban sociologists referred to this phenomenon as <i>land-succession</i>, after the ecological succession in which a given assemblage of plants gives way to another assemblage as an ecosystem moves towards its climax mix of vegetation. Instead of plants these sociologists were concerned with land-uses and modelled this succession as a concentric expansion away from a city's centre. The core was taken over by a central business district, encircled by a zone in transition between manufacture and deteriorating residential neighbourhoods. Next came a ring of working-class neighbourhoods, followed by middle-and upper-class neighbourhoods, and finally the zone for the commuters' zone. Those early studies, however focused on a single city (Chicago), did not give a full explanation of the mechanisms involved in succession. The concentric model seems to be valid for many cities in the USA where incomes do tend to rise with distance from a city's centre, but not for many parts of Continental Europe, where the reverse is the case. [Source: Manuel Delanda, 2006. <i>A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity</i>. London and NY: Continuum.] In the concentric ring model of the city...</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---

firstranker.com

38	24154	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q38	<p>Increased geographical mobility, in turn, interacted with the way in which land-assignment and land-use were determined to produce more drastic changes in the identity of neighborhoods. Central authorities have always had a say in these allocative decisions, and they still have, with zoning regulations having a territorializing effect. Land-rents, on the other hand, which became sufficiently fluid to give rise to economic speculation, were a powerful deterrent force, divorcing the reasons for land-ownership from any consideration of the activities taking place in it and promoting the relatively rapid displacement of one land-use by another. Urban sociologists referred to this phenomenon as <i>land-succession</i>, after the ecological succession in which a given assemblage of plants gives way to another assemblage as an ecosystem moves towards its climax mix of vegetation. Instead of plants these sociologists were concerned with land-uses and modelled this succession as a concentric expansion away from a city's center. The core was taken over by a central business district, encircled by a zone in transition between manufacture and deteriorating residential neighbourhoods. Next came a ring of working-class neighbourhoods, followed by middle-and upper-class neighbourhoods, and finally the zone for the commuters' zone. Those early studies, however focused on a single city (Chicago), did not give a full explanation of the mechanisms involved in succession. The concentric model seems to be valid for many cities in the USA where incomes do tend to rise with distance from a city's centre, but not for many parts of Continental Europe, where the reverse is the case. [Source: Manuel Delanda, 2006. <i>A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity</i>. London and NY: Continuum.] We can infer from the above passage that</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---

firstranker.com



39	24162	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q39	<p>Increased geographical mobility, in turn, interacted with the way in which land-assignment and land-use were determined to produce more drastic changes in the identity of neighborhoods. Central authorities have always had a say in these allocative decisions, and they still have, with zoning regulations having a territorializing effect. Land-rents, on the other hand, which became sufficiently fluid to give rise to economic speculation, were a powerful deterrent force, divorcing the reasons for land-ownership from any consideration of the activities taking place in it and promoting the relatively rapid displacement of one land-use by another. Urban sociologists referred to this phenomenon as <i>land-succession</i>, after the ecological succession in which a given assemblage of plants gives way to another assemblage as an ecosystem moves towards its climax mix of vegetation. Instead of plants these sociologists were concerned with land-uses and modelled this succession as a concentric expansion away from a city's center. The core was taken over by a central business district, encircled by a zone in transition between manufacture and deteriorating residential neighbourhoods. Next came a ring of working-class neighbourhoods, followed by middle-and upper-class neighbourhoods, and finally the zone for the commuters' zone. Those early studies, however focused on a single city (Chicago), did not give a full explanation of the mechanisms involved in succession. The concentric model seems to be valid for many cities in the USA where incomes do tend to rise with distance from a city's centre, but not for many parts of Continental Europe, where the reverse is the case. [Source: Manuel Delanda, 2006. <i>A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity</i>. London and NY: Continuum.] According to the passage, land-succession occurs because</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---



firstranker.com

--	--	--	--	--

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

40	24163	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q40	<p>Increased geographical mobility, in turn, interacted with the way in which land-assignment and land-use were determined to produce more drastic changes in the identity of neighborhoods. Central authorities have always had a say in these allocative decisions, and they still have, with zoning regulations having a territorializing effect. Land-rents, on the other hand, which became sufficiently fluid to give rise to economic speculation, were a powerful deterrent force, divorcing the reasons for land-ownership from any consideration of the activities taking place in it and promoting the relatively rapid displacement of one land-use by another. Urban sociologists referred to this phenomenon as <i>land-succession</i>, after the ecological succession in which a given assemblage of plants gives way to another assemblage as an ecosystem moves towards its climax mix of vegetation. Instead of plants these sociologists were concerned with land-uses and modelled this succession as a concentric expansion away from a city's center. The core was taken over by a central business district, encircled by a zone in transition between manufacture and deteriorating residential neighbourhoods. Next came a ring of working-class neighbourhoods, followed by middle-and upper-class neighbourhoods, and finally the zone for the commuters' zone. Those early studies, however focused on a single city (Chicago), did not give a full explanation of the mechanisms involved in succession. The concentric model seems to be valid for many cities in the USA where incomes do tend to rise with distance from a city's centre, but not for many parts of Continental Europe, where the reverse is the case. [Source: Manuel Delanda, 2006. <i>A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity</i>. London and NY: Continuum.] The passage suggests that the concentric model of the city:</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	--

firstranker.com

--	--	--	--	--

firstRanker.com  
www.FirstRanker.com

41	24156	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q41	<p>The usage of the words "public" and "public sphere" betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings. Their origins go back to various historical phases and, when applied synchronously to the conditions of a bourgeois society that is industrially advanced and constituted as a welfare state, they fuse into a clouded amalgam. Yet the very conditions that make this inherited language seem inappropriate appear to require these words, however confused their employment. Not just ordinary language ... but also the sciences—particularly jurisprudence, political science, and sociology—do not seem capable of replacing traditional categories with "public" and "private," "public sphere," and "public opinion," with more precise terms. We call events and occasions "public" when they are open to all, in contrast to closed or secret affairs—as when we speak of public place or public houses. But as in the expression "public building", the term need not refer to general accessibility; the building does not even have to be open to public traffic. "Public buildings" simply house state institutions and as such are "public". The state is the "public authority." It owes this attribute to its task of promoting the public or common welfare of its rightful members. The word has yet another meaning: it speaks of a "public (official) reception"; on such occasions a powerful display of representation is staged whose "publicity" contains an element of public recognition.... None of these meanings, however, have much affinity with the meaning most commonly associated with the word "public"—expressions like "public opinion", an "outraged " or "informed public," "public opinion", "publish", and "publicize". The subject of this publicity is the public as carrier of public opinion; its function as a critical judge is precisely what makes the public character of proceedings in court, for instance—meaningful. In the realm of the mass media, of course, publicity has changed its meaning. Originally a function of public opinion, it has become an attribute of whatever attracts public opinion: public relations and efforts recently baptized "public relations" are aimed at producing such publicity. The public sphere itself appears as a specific domain—the public domain versus the private. Sometimes the public appears simply as a sector of public opinion that happens to be opposed to the authorities. [Source: Jürgen Habermas, 1991. <i>The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere</i>. Translated by Thomas Burger. Boston: MIT Press.] When did the words "public" and "public sphere" fuse into a "clouded amalgam" according to Habermas?</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---

firstranker.com


--	--	--	--	--

42	24157	DU_J19_MPHIL_SO_CIO_Q42	<p>The usage of the words "public" and "public sphere" betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings. Their origins go back to various historical phases and, when applied synchronously to the conditions of a bourgeois society that is industrially advanced and constituted as a welfare state, they fuse into a clouded amalgam. Yet the very conditions that make this inherited language seem inappropriate appear to require these words, however confusing their employment. Not just ordinary language ... but also the sciences—particularly jurisprudence, political science, and sociology—do not seem capable of replacing traditional categories with "public" and "private," "public sphere," and "public opinion," with more precise terms. We call events and occasions "public" when they are open to all, in contrast to closed or secret affairs—as when we speak of public place or public houses. But as in the expression "public building", the term need not refer to general accessibility; the building does not even have to be open to public traffic. "Public buildings" simply house state institutions and as such are "public". The state is the "public authority." It owes this attribute to its task of promoting the public or common welfare of its rightful members. The word has yet another meaning: it speaks of a "public (official) reception"; on such occasions a powerful display of representation is staged whose "publicity" contains an element of public recognition.... None of these meanings, however, have much affinity with the meaning most commonly associated with the word "public"—expressions like "public opinion", an "outraged " or "informed public," "publicity", "publish", and "publicize". The subject of this publicity is the public as carrier of public opinion; its function as a critical judge is precisely what makes the public character of proceedings in court, for instance—meaningful. In the realm of the mass media, of course, publicity has changed its meaning. Originally a function of public opinion, it has become an attribute of whatever attracts public opinion: public relations and efforts recently baptized "publicity" are aimed at producing such publicity. The public sphere itself appears as a specific domain—the public domain versus the private. Sometimes the public appears simply as a sector of public opinion that happens to be opposed to the authorities. [Source: Jürgen Habermas, 1991. <i>The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere</i>. Translated by Thomas Burger. Boston: MIT Press.] Why does the word "public" continue to be used even though it has so many confusing meanings?</p>
----	-------	-------------------------	---

firstranker.com

firstranker.com

43	24158	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q43	<p>The usage of the words "public" and "public sphere" betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings. Their origins go back to various historical phases and, when applied synchronously to the conditions of a bourgeois society that is industrially advanced and constituted as a welfare state, they fuse into a clouded amalgam. Yet the very conditions that make this inherited language seem inappropriate appear to require these words, however confused their employment. Not just ordinary language ... but also the sciences—particularly jurisprudence, political science, and sociology—do not seem capable of replacing traditional categories with "public" and "private," "public sphere," and "public opinion," with more precise terms. We call events and occasions "public" when they are open to all, in contrast to closed or secret affairs—as when we speak of public place or public houses. But as in the expression "public building", the term need not refer to general accessibility; the building does not even have to be open to public traffic. "Public buildings" simply house state institutions and as such are "public". The state is the "public authority." It owes this attribute to its task of promoting the public or common welfare of its rightful members. The word has yet another meaning: it speaks of a "public (official) reception"; on such occasions a powerful display of representation is staged whose "publicity" contains an element of public recognition.... None of these meanings, however, have much affinity with the meaning most commonly associated with the term: "public" as a category—expressions like "public opinion", an "outraged " or "informed public," "publicity", "publish", and "publicize". The subject of this publicity is the public as carrier of public opinion. Its function as a critical judge is precisely what makes the public character of proceedings in court, for instance—meaningful. In the realm of the mass media, of course, publicity has changed its meaning. Originally a function of public opinion, it has become an attribute of whatever attracts public opinion: public relations and efforts recently baptized "publicity" are aimed at producing such publicity. The public sphere itself appears as a specific domain—the public domain versus the private. Sometimes the public appears simply as a sector of public opinion that happens to be opposed to the authorities. [Source: Jürgen Habermas, 1991. <i>The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere</i>. Translated by Thomas Burger. Boston: MIT Press.] How has the meaning of 'publicity' changed in the context of mass media?</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	--



firstRanker.com  
www.Firs

firstranker.com

44	24159	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q44	<p>The usage of the words "public" and "public sphere" betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings. Their origins go back to various historical phases and, when applied synchronously to the conditions of a bourgeois society that is industrially advanced and constituted as a welfare state, they fuse into a clouded amalgam. Yet the very conditions that make this inherited language seem inappropriate appear to require these words, however confused their employment. Not just ordinary language ... but also the sciences—particularly jurisprudence, political science, and sociology—do not seem capable of replacing traditional categories with "public" and "private," "public sphere," and "public opinion," with more precise terms. We call events and occasions "public" when they are open to all, in contrast to closed or secret affairs—as when we speak of public place or public houses. But as in the expression "public building", the term need not refer to general accessibility; the building does not even have to be open to public traffic. "Public buildings" simply house state institutions and as such are "public". The state is the "public authority." It owes this attribute to its task of promoting the public or common welfare of its rightful members. The word has yet another meaning: it speaks of a "public (official) reception"; on such occasions a powerful display of representation is staged whose "publicity" contains an element of public recognition.... None of these meanings, however, have much affinity with the meaning most commonly associated with the word "public"—expressions like "public opinion", an "outraged " or "informed public," "publish", and "publicize". The subject of this publicity is the public as carrier of public opinion; its function as a critical judge is precisely what makes the public character of proceedings in court, for instance—meaningful. In the realm of the mass media, of course, publicity has changed its meaning. Originally a function of public opinion, it has become an attribute of whatever attracts public opinion: public relations and efforts recently baptized "publicity" are aimed at producing such publicity. The public sphere itself appears as a specific domain—the public domain versus the private. Sometimes the public appears simply as a sector of public opinion that happens to be opposed to the authorities. [Source: Jürgen Habermas, 1991. <i>The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere</i>. Translated by Thomas Burger. Boston: MIT Press.] Which of the following senses of 'public' are included in this passage?</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	---

firstranker.com

45	24160	DU_J19_ MPHIL_SO CIO_Q45	<p>The usage of the words "public" and "public sphere" betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings. Their origins go back to various historical phases and, when applied synchronously to the conditions of a bourgeois society that is industrially advanced and constituted as a welfare state, they fuse into a clouded amalgam. Yet the very conditions that make this inherited language seem inappropriate appear to require these words, however confused their employment. Not just ordinary language ... but also the sciences—particularly jurisprudence, political science, and sociology—do not seem capable of replacing traditional categories with "public" and "private," "public sphere," and "public opinion," with more precise terms. We call events and occasions "public" when they are open to all, in contrast to closed or secret affairs—as when we speak of public place or public houses. But as in the expression "public building", the term need not refer to general accessibility; the building does not even have to be open to public traffic. "Public buildings" simply house state institutions and as such are "public". The state is the "public authority." It owes this attribute to its task of promoting the public or common welfare of its rightful members. The word has yet another meaning: it speaks of a "public (official) reception"; on such occasions a powerful display of representation is staged whose "publicity" contains an element of public recognition.... None of these meanings, however, have much affinity with the meaning most commonly associated with the term—category—expressions like "public opinion", an "outraged " or "informed public," "publish", and "publicize". The subject of this publicity is the public as carrier of public opinion; its function as a critical judge is precisely what makes the public character of proceedings in court, for instance—meaningful. In the realm of the mass media, of course, publicity has changed its meaning. Originally a function of public opinion, it has become an attribute of whatever attracts public opinion: public relations and efforts recently baptized "publicity" are aimed at producing such publicity. The public sphere itself appears as a specific domain—the public domain versus the private. Sometimes the public appears simply as a sector of public opinion that happens to be opposed to the authorities. [Source: Jürgen Habermas, 1991. <i>The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere</i>. Translated by Thomas Burger. Boston: MIT Press.] In India, which of the following terms involves a meaning that is contrary to the meanings suggested in the passage?</p>
----	-------	--------------------------------	--

46	24178	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q46	<p>Compared to 2005, the percentage increase in accidental deaths in 2015 is the highest for:</p> <table><tr><th colspan="6">Table X: Some Causes of Accidental Deaths 2005—2015</th></tr><tr><th colspan="6">All-India data for Select Years, Total Deaths and Annual Average Deaths</th></tr><tr><th>Causes</th><th>2005</th><th>2010</th><th>2015</th><th>Total Deaths 2005—2015</th><th>Annual Average Deaths 2005—2015</th></tr><tr><td>Air-Crash</td><td>6</td><td>23</td><td>23</td><td>188</td><td>188</td></tr><tr><td>Drowning</td><td>23571</td><td>28001</td><td>29822</td><td>304356</td><td>304356</td></tr><tr><td>Electrocution</td><td>6987</td><td>9059</td><td>9986</td><td>95852</td><td>95852</td></tr><tr><td>Factory/Machine accidents</td><td>671</td><td>1043</td><td>695</td><td>9866</td><td>9866</td></tr><tr><td>Natural Calamity</td><td>22415</td><td>25066</td><td>10510</td><td>240504</td><td>240504</td></tr><tr><td>Traffic Accidents</td><td>118265</td><td>161736</td><td>177423</td><td>1695898</td><td>1695898</td></tr><tr><td>Total Accidental Deaths</td><td>294175</td><td>384649</td><td>413457</td><td>3791074</td><td>3791074</td></tr></table> <p>Source: Adapted from <i>National Health Profile 2018</i>, Table 3.2.3, p.137.</p>	Table X: Some Causes of Accidental Deaths 2005—2015						All-India data for Select Years, Total Deaths and Annual Average Deaths						Causes	2005	2010	2015	Total Deaths 2005—2015	Annual Average Deaths 2005—2015	Air-Crash	6	23	23	188	188	Drowning	23571	28001	29822	304356	304356	Electrocution	6987	9059	9986	95852	95852	Factory/Machine accidents	671	1043	695	9866	9866	Natural Calamity	22415	25066	10510	240504	240504	Traffic Accidents	118265	161736	177423	1695898	1695898	Total Accidental Deaths	294175	384649	413457	3791074	3791074
Table X: Some Causes of Accidental Deaths 2005—2015																																																															
All-India data for Select Years, Total Deaths and Annual Average Deaths																																																															
Causes	2005	2010	2015	Total Deaths 2005—2015	Annual Average Deaths 2005—2015																																																										
Air-Crash	6	23	23	188	188																																																										
Drowning	23571	28001	29822	304356	304356																																																										
Electrocution	6987	9059	9986	95852	95852																																																										
Factory/Machine accidents	671	1043	695	9866	9866																																																										
Natural Calamity	22415	25066	10510	240504	240504																																																										
Traffic Accidents	118265	161736	177423	1695898	1695898																																																										
Total Accidental Deaths	294175	384649	413457	3791074	3791074																																																										

47

24179

 DU\_J19\_  
MPHIL\_SO  
CIO\_Q47

Consider the following statements based on the above Table: I. The number of accidental deaths is less than the annual average of deaths from 2005–2015 for all causes. II. The number of accidental deaths in 2015 is greater than that in 2005 for all causes. Which of these statements is/are TRUE?

<b>Table X: Some Causes of Accidental Deaths 2005–2015</b> All-India data for Select Years, Total Deaths and Annual Average Deaths					
Causes	2005	2010	2015	Total Deaths	Ann. Avg.
				2005–2015	2005–2015
Air-Crash	6	23	23	188	17
Drowning	23571	28001	29822	304356	27669
Electrocution	6987	9059	9986	95852	8714
Factory/Machine accidents	671	1043	695	9866	897
Natural Calamity	22415	25066	10510	240504	21864
Traffic Accidents	118265	161736	177423	1695898	154173
Total Accidental Deaths	294175	384649	413457	3791074	379107

Source: Adapted from *National Health Profile 2018*, Table 3.2.3, p.137.

48

24180

 DU\_J19\_  
MPHIL\_SO  
CIO\_Q48

**Table X: Some Causes of Accidental Deaths 2005–2015**  
All-India data for Select Years, Total Deaths and Annual Average Deaths

Causes	2005	2010	2015	Total Deaths
				2005–2015
Air-Crash	6	23	23	188
Drowning	23571	28001	29822	304356

			<table><tr><td>Electrocution</td><td>6987</td><td>9059</td><td>9986</td></tr><tr><td>Factory/Machine accidents</td><td>671</td><td>1043</td><td>695</td></tr><tr><td>Natural Calamity</td><td>22415</td><td>25066</td><td>10510</td></tr><tr><td>Traffic Accidents</td><td>118265</td><td>161736</td><td>177423</td></tr><tr><td>Total Accidental Deaths</td><td>294175</td><td>384649</td><td>413457</td></tr></table> <p>Source: Adapted from <i>National Health Profile 2018</i>, Table 3.2.3, p.137.</p>	Electrocution	6987	9059	9986	Factory/Machine accidents	671	1043	695	Natural Calamity	22415	25066	10510	Traffic Accidents	118265	161736	177423	Total Accidental Deaths	294175	384649	413457																												
Electrocution	6987	9059	9986																																																
Factory/Machine accidents	671	1043	695																																																
Natural Calamity	22415	25066	10510																																																
Traffic Accidents	118265	161736	177423																																																
Total Accidental Deaths	294175	384649	413457																																																
49	24181	DU_J19_MPHIL_SO CIO_Q49	<p>Thesecondlargestproportional(orpercentage)increaseinthenumberofdeathsfrom2005to2015</p> <table><caption>Table X: Some Causes of Accidental Deaths 2005—2015 All-India data for Select Years, Total Deaths and Annual Average Deaths</caption><thead><tr><th>Causes</th><th>2005</th><th>2010</th><th>2015</th><th>Total Deaths 2005—2015</th><th>Ann. Avg. Deaths 2005—2015</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Air-Crash</td><td>6</td><td>23</td><td>23</td><td>188</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>Drowning</td><td>23571</td><td>28001</td><td>29822</td><td>304356</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>Electrocution</td><td>6987</td><td>9059</td><td>9986</td><td>95852</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Factory/Machine accidents</td><td>671</td><td>1043</td><td>695</td><td>9866</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Natural Calamity</td><td>22415</td><td>25066</td><td>10510</td><td>240504</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>Traffic Accidents</td><td>118265</td><td>161736</td><td>177423</td><td>1695898</td><td>154</td></tr><tr><td>Total Accidental Deaths</td><td>294175</td><td>384649</td><td>413457</td><td>3791074</td><td>379</td></tr></tbody></table> <p>Source: Adapted from <i>National Health Profile 2018</i>, Table 3.2.3, p.137.</p>	Causes	2005	2010	2015	Total Deaths 2005—2015	Ann. Avg. Deaths 2005—2015	Air-Crash	6	23	23	188	27	Drowning	23571	28001	29822	304356	27	Electrocution	6987	9059	9986	95852	8	Factory/Machine accidents	671	1043	695	9866	8	Natural Calamity	22415	25066	10510	240504	21	Traffic Accidents	118265	161736	177423	1695898	154	Total Accidental Deaths	294175	384649	413457	3791074	379
Causes	2005	2010	2015	Total Deaths 2005—2015	Ann. Avg. Deaths 2005—2015																																														
Air-Crash	6	23	23	188	27																																														
Drowning	23571	28001	29822	304356	27																																														
Electrocution	6987	9059	9986	95852	8																																														
Factory/Machine accidents	671	1043	695	9866	8																																														
Natural Calamity	22415	25066	10510	240504	21																																														
Traffic Accidents	118265	161736	177423	1695898	154																																														
Total Accidental Deaths	294175	384649	413457	3791074	379																																														

50

24182

 DU\_J19\_  
 MPHIL\_SO  
 CIO\_Q50

The last row of Table B shows the total number of accidental deaths from all causes, even though the causes of death are shown in the rows above.

Consider the following statements based on Table B: I. During the period 2005 to 2015, Traffic Accidents counted for more deaths than all other causes combined. II. Statistically speaking, air travel is safer than travel by road. III. Between 2005 and 2015, on average, Drowning killed more than thirty times as many people who died due to Factory/Machine Accidents each year. Which of these statements is/are correct?

**Table X: Some Causes of Accidental Deaths 2005–2015**  
 All-India data for Select Years, Total Deaths and Annual Average Deaths

Causes				Total Deaths	Ann. Avg. Deaths
	2005	2010	2015	2005–2015	2005–2015
Air-Crash	6	23	23	188	27
Drowning	23571	28001	29822	304356	27
Electrocution	6987	9059	9986	95852	8
Factory/Machine accidents	671	1043	695	9866	21
Natural Calamity	22415	25066	10510	240504	154
Traffic Accidents	118265	161736	177423	1695898	379
Total Accidental Deaths	294175	384649	413457	3791074	

				Source: Adapted from <i>National Health Profile 2018</i> , Table 3.2.3, p.137.
--	--	--	--	--

firstranker.com  
www.FirstRanker.com

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)

firstranker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)





firstRanker.com  
[www.FirstRanker.com](http://www.FirstRanker.com)