Download DUET Master 2018 DU MPhil Phd in Sociology Question Paper With Answer Key

The problem then is that of a basis for breaking through the circular stability of a zero-sum power system. The crucial point is that this can only happen if the collectivity and its members are ready to assume new binding obligations over and above those previously in force. The crucial need is to justify this extension and to transform the "sentiment" that something ought to be done into a commitment to implement the sentiment by positive action, including coercive sanctions if necessary. The crucial agency of this process seems to be leadership, precisely conceived as possessing a component analytically independent of the routine power position of office, which defines the leader as the mobilizer of justifications for policies which would not be undertaken under the circular flow assumptions.

It may be suggested that the parallel to credit creations holds with respect to time-extension as well as in other respects. The increments of effectiveness which are necessary to implement new binding policies which constitute an addition to the total burden on the collectivity cannot simply be willed into being; they require organizational changes through recombination of the factors of effectiveness, development of new agencies, procurement of personnel, new norms, and even changes in bases of legitimation. Hence leadership cannot justifiably be held responsible for effective implementation immediately, and conversely, the sources of political support must be willing to trust their leadership in the sense of not demanding immediate by the time of the next election "pay-off" of the power-value of their votes in their decisions dictated by their own interests.

Talcott Parsons. 1963. 'On the Concept of Political Power, in American Philosophical Society Journal, vol.107, no.3.

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What are the organizational changes that the author is referring to? [Question ID = 2447]

1. All of these [Option ID = 9788]
2. development of new agencies, [Option ID = 9785]
3. procurement of personnel, [Option ID = 9786]
4. new norms, and changes in bases of legitimation [Option ID = 9787]

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Correct Answer :-

All of these [Option ID = 9788]

What can change the circular stability of a zero-sum power system?

[Question ID = 2446]

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1. economic investment [Option ID = 9783]
2. administrative measures [Option ID = 9781]
3. judicial interaction [Option ID = 9784]
4. leadership independent of routine power position [Option ID = 9782]

Correct Answer :-

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leadership independent of routine power position [Option ID = 9782]

The other perspective is of Indian feminist scholarship. There is now a very interesting debate on the place of judicial activism, and concomitant casting of issues in a rights framework, when it comes to securing the well-being of women in all situations. Litigation to develop more specific legal instruments, or to make bureaucratic delivery of services more accountable, is not seen by some feminists as a panacea. There is an interesting debate among feminists about the efficacy even desirability of judicial activism in securing the rights of women (Rajan 2003, 34-35). Feminist theorists and activists have questioned the wisdom of allowing liberal state ideologies to express themselves in the language carefully crafted and made legitimate by years of struggle in women's movements. Should Indian environmentalists have the same worries? Does judicial activism, relying on the enterprise and commitments of environmental justice movements, reformulate the environment question in terms enabling cooptation by the liberal state? What role can metropolitan civil society organizations play in between quality of life issues forcefully articulated by a newly assertive and growing middle class, and rights to livelihood for most poor people driven to the wall by private-public partnerships in industrial and social infrastructure?

K. Sivaramakrishnan. 2011. Environment, Law, and Democracy in India. Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 70, No. 4.

From the above passage we can definitively conclude that feminists and environmentalists: [Question ID = 2525]

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1. Have the same set of concerns [Option ID = 10097]
2. Have much to learn from each other [Option ID = 10098]
3. None of these [Option ID = 10100]
4. Are both sceptical of judicial activism [Option ID = 10099]

Correct Answer :-

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None of these [Option ID = 10100]

The other perspective is of Indian feminist scholarship. There is now a very interesting debate on the place of judicial activism, and concomitant casting of issues in a rights framework, when it comes to securing the well-being of women in all situations. Litigation to develop more specific legal instruments, or to make bureaucratic delivery of services more accountable, is not seen by some feminists as a panacea. There is an interesting debate among feminists about the efficacy even desirability of judicial activism in securing the rights of women (Rajan 2003, 34-35). Feminist theorists and activists have questioned the wisdom of allowing liberal state ideologies to express themselves in the language carefully crafted and made legitimate by years of struggle in women's movements. Should Indian environmentalists have the same worries? Does judicial activism, relying on the enterprise and commitments of environmental justice movements, reformulate the environment question in terms enabling cooptation by the liberal state? What role can metropolitan civil society organizations play in between quality of life issues forcefully articulated by a newly assertive and growing middle class, and rights to livelihood for most poor people driven to the wall by private-public partnerships in industrial and social infrastructure?

K. Sivaramakrishnan. 2011. Environment, Law, and Democracy in India. Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 70, No. 4.

From the above paragraph, it can be inferred that: [Question ID = 2522]

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1. The feminist movement can learn from the challenges faced by the environmental movement [Option ID = 10085]
2. The efficacy and desirability of judicial activism may be debated. [Option ID = 10087]
3. The quality of life issues of the newly assertive and growing middle class is responsible for the loss of livelihood of the poor. [Option ID = 10088]
4. Judicial activism allows the cooptation of environmentalists by the liberal state. [Option ID = 10086]

Correct Answer :-

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• The efficacy and desirability of judicial activism may be debated. [Option ID = 10087]

The other perspective is of Indian feminist scholarship. There is now a very interesting debate on the place of judicial activism, and concomitant casting of issues in a rights framework, when it comes to securing the well-being of women in all situations. Litigation to develop more specific legal instruments, or to make bureaucratic delivery of services more accountable, is not seen by some feminists as a panacea. There is an interesting debate among feminists about the efficacy even desirability of judicial activism in securing the rights of women (Rajan 2003, 34-35). Feminist theorists and activists have questioned the wisdom of allowing liberal state ideologies to express themselves in the language carefully crafted and made legitimate by years of struggle in women's movements. Should Indian environmentalists have the same worries? Does judicial activism, relying on the enterprise and commitments of environmental justice movements, reformulate the environment question in terms enabling cooptation by the liberal state? What role can metropolitan civil society organizations play in between quality of life issues forcefully articulated by a newly assertive and growing middle class, and rights to livelihood for most poor people driven to the wall by private-public partnerships in industrial and social infrastructure?

K. Sivaramakrishnan. 2011. Environment, Law, and Democracy in India. Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 70, No. 4.

According to the above passage, judicial activism is associated with: [Question ID = 2523]

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1. Development of more specific legal instruments [Option ID = 10091]
2. Reformulating the environmental question [Option ID = 10089]
3. All of these [Option ID = 10092]
4. Reframing the well being of women in a rights framework [Option ID = 10090]

Correct Answer :-

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Reframing the well being of women in a rights framework [Option ID = 10090]

The other perspective is of Indian feminist scholarship. There is now a very interesting debate on the place of judicial activism, and concomitant casting of issues in a rights framework, when it comes to securing the well-being of women in all situations. Litigation to develop more specific legal instruments, or to make bureaucratic delivery of services more accountable, is not seen by some feminists as a panacea. There is an interesting debate among feminists about the efficacy even desirability of judicial activism in securing the rights of women (Rajan 2003, 34-35). Feminist theorists and activists have questioned the wisdom of allowing liberal state ideologies to express themselves in the language carefully crafted and made legitimate by years of struggle in women's movements. Should Indian environmentalists have the same worries? Does judicial activism, relying on the enterprise and commitments of environmental justice movements, reformulate the environment question in terms enabling cooptation by the liberal state? What role can metropolitan civil society organizations play in between quality of life issues forcefully articulated by a newly assertive and growing middle class, and rights to livelihood for most poor people driven to the wall by private-public partnerships in industrial and social infrastructure?

K. Sivaramakrishnan. 2011. Environment, Law, and Democracy in India. Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 70, No. 4.

Which of the following should be entirely avoided according to Indian feminist scholarship?

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a. Casting of issues in a rights framework

b. Making bureaucratic delivery of services more accountable

c. Litigation to develop more specific legal instruments

d. Judicial activism [Question ID = 2524]

1. a, c, and d [Option ID = 10095]

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1. All of these [Option ID = 10093]
2. None of these [Option ID = 10096]
3. a and d [Option ID = 10094]

Correct Answer :-

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None of these [Option ID = 10096]

One of the first serious anthropological explorations of human rights issues was Alison Dundes Renteln's short monograph International Human Rights (1989). The title is slightly misleading, and the first word could well have been 'cross-cultural' since that is what the book is about. Using material from a very large database known as the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) as well as a string of ethnographic studies, Renteln asks to what extent it might be possible, on empirical grounds, to identify a shared set of moral principles common to humanity. The book argues that on the basis of existing cultural variation, such a set of common values is impossible to establish. Only in a few societies, she writes, does one have a concept covering an abstract 'humanity'. The only shared moral principle she discovers is lex talionis, the principle of proportionality, which states that sanctions should be proportional to the gravity of the transgression. Since transgressions are culturally defined, this conclusion amounts to stating the obvious, to put it mildly.

Renteln's findings were far from controversial or unexpected within the anthropological community. After all, one of the liveliest debates in the 1980s had concerned the concept of the person ... The topic may sound a lofty and academic one, interesting in the seminar room but worthless outside it, but universal rights presuppose a particular view of the person as an individual endowed with particular rights, so the debate has relevance beyond mere academia. For example, anthropologists sometimes distinguished between the sociocentric person, who places the community before the individual (the person has few rights and many duties), and the egocentric person, whose universe is centred on him or herself (with few duties and wide-ranging rights). When it was shown that even the entities supposedly endowed with particular rights vary, that is persons, defending claims to universality seemed to become very difficult indeed. At the same time, not all anthropologists were equally committed to cultural relativism. Some saw it as an obstacle to the liberation of oppressed peoples, and fashioned an anthropology, sometimes Marxist but sometimes not, emphasizing that historical change and the increased integration of peoples into the global world system created an incipient common moral space within which conversations about personhood, morality and politics would become possible.

Thomas Hylland Eriksen (2014). Global Citizenship and the Challenge from Cultural Relativism, In Aksel Braanen Sterri (ed.), Global citizen challenges and responsibility in an interconnected world. Rotterdam, Sense Publishers.

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From the above passage it can be inferred that: [Question ID = 2541]

1. Human rights discourse uses notions of personhood which may be egocentric but not sociocentric. [Option ID = 10162]
2. Anthropological notion of personhood problematises the concept of abstract humanity. [Option ID = 10161]
3. Anthropological notion of personhood has contributed to the human rights discourse. [Option ID = 10164]
4. The concern with personhood is largely an academic fad. [Option ID = 10163]

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Correct Answer :-

• Anthropological notion of personhood problematises the concept of abstract humanity. [Option ID = 10161]

One of the first serious anthropological explorations of human rights issues was Alison Dundes Renteln's short monograph International Human Rights (1989). The title is slightly misleading, and the first word could well have been 'cross-cultural' since that is what the book is about. Using material from a very large database known as the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) as well as a string of ethnographic studies, Renteln asks to what extent it might be possible, on empirical grounds, to identify a shared set of moral principles common to humanity. The book argues that on the basis of existing cultural variation, such a set of common values is impossible to establish. Only in a few societies, she writes, does one have a concept covering an abstract 'humanity'. The only shared moral principle she discovers is lex talionis, the principle of proportionality, which states that sanctions should be proportional to the gravity of the transgression. Since transgressions are culturally defined, this conclusion amounts to stating the obvious, to put it mildly.

Renteln's findings were far from controversial or unexpected within the anthropological community. After all, one of the liveliest debates in the 1980s had concerned the concept of the person ... The topic may sound a lofty and academic one, interesting in the seminar room but worthless outside it, but universal rights presuppose a particular view of the person as an individual endowed with particular rights, so the debate has relevance beyond mere academia. For example, anthropologists sometimes distinguished between the sociocentric person, who places the community before the individual (the person has few rights and many duties), and the egocentric person, whose universe is centred on him or herself (with few duties and wide-ranging rights). When it was shown that even the entities supposedly endowed with particular rights vary, that is persons, defending claims to universality seemed to become very difficult indeed. At the same time, not all anthropologists were equally committed to cultural relativism. Some saw it as an obstacle to the liberation of oppressed peoples, and fashioned an anthropology, sometimes Marxist but sometimes not, emphasizing that historical change and the increased integration of peoples into the global world system created an incipient common moral space within which conversations about personhood, morality and politics would become possible.

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Thomas Hylland Eriksen (2014). Global Citizenship and the Challenge from Cultural Relativism, In Aksel Braanen Sterri (ed.), Global citizen challenges and responsibility in an interconnected world. Rotterdam, Sense Publishers.

Renteln's work argued that:

[Question ID = 2540]

1. Lex talionis should be the basis of international human rights because of its universality. [Option ID = 10157]
2. Lex talionis is concerned with an abstract concept of humanity. [Option ID = 10158]

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3. None of these [Option ID = 10160]
4. The idea of universal human rights has very little empirical foundation. [Option ID = 10159]

Correct Answer :-

The idea of universal human rights has very little empirical foundation. [Option ID = 10159]

One of the first serious anthropological explorations of human rights issues was Alison Dundes Renteln's short monograph International Human Rights (1989). The title is slightly misleading, and the first word could well have been 'cross-cultural' since that is what the book is about. Using material from a very large database known as the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) as well as a string of ethnographic studies, Renteln asks to what extent it might be possible, on empirical grounds, to identify a shared set of moral principles common to humanity. The book argues that on the basis of existing cultural variation, such a set of common values is impossible to establish. Only in a few societies, she writes, does one have a concept covering an abstract 'humanity'. The only shared moral principle she discovers is lex talionis, the principle of proportionality, which states that sanctions should be proportional to the gravity of the transgression. Since transgressions are culturally defined, this conclusion amounts to stating the obvious, to put it mildly.

Renteln's findings were far from controversial or unexpected within the anthropological community. After all, one of the liveliest debates in the 1980s had concerned the concept of the person ... The topic may sound a lofty and academic one, interesting in the seminar room but worthless outside it, but universal rights presuppose a particular view of the person as an individual endowed with particular rights, so the debate has relevance beyond mere academia. For example, anthropologists sometimes distinguished between the sociocentric person, who places the community before the individual (the person has few rights and many duties), and the egocentric person, whose universe is centred on him or herself (with few duties and wide-ranging rights). When it was shown that even the entities supposedly endowed with particular rights vary, that is persons, defending claims to universality seemed to become very difficult indeed. At the same time, not all anthropologists were equally committed to cultural relativism. Some saw it as an obstacle to the liberation of oppressed peoples, and fashioned an anthropology, sometimes Marxist but sometimes not, emphasizing that historical change and the increased integration of peoples into the global world system created an incipient common moral space within which conversations about personhood, morality and politics would become possible.

Thomas Hylland Eriksen (2014). Global Citizenship and the Challenge from Cultural Relativism, In Aksel Braanen Sterri (ed.), Global citizen challenges and responsibility in an interconnected world. Rotterdam, Sense Publishers.

From the above passage it can be inferred that Renteln's findings were uncontroversial for anthropologists because:

[Question ID = 2539]

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1. Anthropologists are not committed to cultural relativism. [Option ID = 10154]
2. Anthropologists have long accepted the idea of international human rights. [Option ID = 10153]
3. None of these [Option ID = 10156]
4. She focused on the concept of the person which has a wide currency in anthropology. [Option ID = 10155]

Correct Answer :-

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None of these [Option ID = 10156]

But what is the logic, if any, that ties together these argumentations against the many historic evidences of Hindu divorce? We have seen that the denial concerning Hindu divorce elaborates four main themes: time, caste, gender, and law. All the above argumentations, very often interwoven, are related to the mainstream conceptualization of the indissolubility of Hindu marriage that substantiated the various degrees of the illegitimacy of Hindu divorce. They find their roots in the specific history and scope of Hindu law and in the opposition between law and custom: the first dictating the axiom of the indissoluble marriage and the second providing various forms of dissolution falling in the realm of custom and beyond the one of the law. Yet the exclusion of the everyday practices from the legal domain was possibly against the very essence of South Asian law, which has been characterized since ancient times by a great attention to the right balance between ruler's law and people's law. Hindu treatises emphasized the king's duty to respect people's customs, thereby attesting the relevance of a customary justice ... and the legal administration of classical and medieval India tended to recognize custom as an integral part of the legal system. Such a pragmatic approach has also been confirmed by contextual sources, i.e. drama and novels, showing that the king used his own means to achieve order and to administer justice beyond the precepts of upper caste Hindu tradition .... Instead, the opposition between the ideal of indissoluble marriage perceived to be the law, against forms of customary divorce bringing disrepute and loss of status was, first of all, the ideological elitist perspective of the Brahman upper caste.

Livia Holden. 2008. Hindu divorce: A legal anthropology, Aldershot, Ashgate

From the above passage it can be inferred that:

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[Question ID = 2545]

1. There is much historical evidence which disproves the idea of indissolubility of Hindu marriage. [Option ID = 10178]
2. Illegitimacy of divorce is common due to its customary character. [Option ID = 10177]
3. All of these [Option ID = 10180]
4. The idea that divorce brings about loss of status is very common across social groups. [Option ID = 10179]

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Correct Answer :-

There is much historical evidence which disproves the idea of indissolubility of Hindu marriage. [Option ID = 10178]

But what is the logic, if any, that ties together these argumentations against the many historic evidences of Hindu divorce? We have seen that the denial concerning Hindu divorce elaborates four main themes: time, caste, gender, and law. All the above argumentations, very often interwoven, are related to the mainstream conceptualization of the indissolubility of Hindu marriage that substantiated the various degrees of the illegitimacy of Hindu divorce. They find their roots in the specific history and scope of Hindu law and in the opposition between law and custom: the first dictating the axiom of the indissoluble marriage and the second providing various forms of dissolution falling in the realm of custom and beyond the one of the law. Yet the exclusion of the everyday practices from the legal domain was possibly against the very essence of South Asian law, which has been characterized since ancient times by a great attention to the right balance between ruler's law and people's law. Hindu treatises emphasized the king's duty to respect people's customs, thereby attesting the relevance of a customary justice... and the legal administration of classical and medieval India tended to recognize custom as an integral part of the legal system. Such a pragmatic approach has also been confirmed by contextual sources, i.e. drama and novels, showing that the king used his own means to achieve order and to administer justice beyond the precepts of upper caste Hindu tradition .... Instead, the opposition between the ideal of indissoluble marriage perceived to be the law, against forms of customary divorce bringing disrepute and loss of status was, first of all, the ideological elitist perspective of the Brahman upper caste.

Livia Holden. 2008. Hindu divorce: A legal anthropology, Aldershot, Ashgate

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From the above passage, it can be inferred that: [Question ID = 2543]

1. None of these [Option ID = 10172]
2. Divorce is largely unknown in Indian subcontinent. [Option ID = 10171]
3. Hindu marriages are a sacrament. [Option ID = 10170]
4. Hindu marriages have always been indissoluble. [Option ID = 10169]

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Correct Answer :-

None of these [Option ID = 10172]

But what is the logic, if any, that ties together these argumentations against the many historic evidences of Hindu divorce? We have seen that the denial concerning Hindu divorce elaborates four main themes: time, caste, gender, and law. All the above argumentations, very often interwoven, are related to the mainstream conceptualization of the indissolubility of Hindu marriage that substantiated the various degrees of the illegitimacy of Hindu divorce. They find their roots in the specific history and scope of Hindu law and in the opposition between law and custom: the first dictating the axiom of the indissoluble marriage and the second providing various forms of dissolution falling in the realm of custom and beyond the one of the law. Yet the exclusion of the everyday practices from the legal domain was possibly against the very essence of South Asian law, which has been characterized since ancient times by a great attention to the right balance between ruler's law and people's law. Hindu treatises emphasized the king's duty to respect people's customs, thereby attesting the relevance of a customary justice... and the legal administration of classical and medieval India tended to recognize custom as an integral part of the legal system. Such a pragmatic approach has also been confirmed by contextual sources, i.e. drama and novels, showing that the king used his own means to achieve order and to administer justice beyond the precepts of upper caste Hindu tradition .... Instead, the opposition between the ideal of indissoluble marriage perceived to be the law, against forms of customary divorce bringing disrepute and loss of status was, first of all, the ideological elitist perspective of the Brahman upper caste.

Livia Holden. 2008. Hindu divorce: A legal anthropology, Aldershot, Ashgate

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From the above passage it can be inferred that: [Question ID = 2544]

1. Because marriages are indissoluble among Hindus, divorce is illegitimate in various degrees. [Option ID = 10176]
2. There was a balance between the people's law and the rulers law which permitted a greater acceptability of divorce than the subsequent separation of law and custom. [Option ID = 10174]
3. Divorce was recognized by the precolonial rulers although this changed in colonial times. [Option ID = 10175]
4. Divorce is much more common in modern times than in the past and this is owing to its legal recognition. [Option ID = 10173]

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Correct Answer :-

There was a balance between the people's law and the rulers law which permitted a greater acceptability of divorce than the subsequent separation of law and custom. [Option ID = 10174]

It is part of the folk wisdom of the field that historians have been increasingly enthusiastic about new developments in the sociology of scientific knowledge while philosophers of science have remained more resistant. Certainly, there has been a marked antipathy to some forms of philosophy by sociologists. Philosophy bashing perhaps reached its apogee with Bloor's (1976: 45) comment that "to ask questions of the sort which philosophers address to themselves is usually to paralyse the mind." Since the debate between Bloor (1981) and Laudan (1981), however, some philosophers have evinced sympathy for the work of the sociology of scientific knowledge (for example, Nickles, 1982, 1984). This suggests that it is perhaps no longer productive to dismiss all attempts at philosophizing science (Knorr-Cetina, 1982a).

One good reason for not dismissing philosophy is that the positions of most authors both within and beyond the social study of science are based on deep-seated ontological commitments rather than upon any empirical account of science. This is why empirical evidence (of the sort provided by Laboratory Life) is unlikely to change any minds. And this is why those who read the book through realist spectacles will see error (for example, Bazerman, 1980: 17).

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Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar. 1986 (1971). Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts. London, Sage.

Which of the following statements can be inferred from the above passage? [Question ID = 2548]

1. Some sociologists find some philosophical questions meaningless. [Option ID = 10192]
2. Sociologists have been supportive of philosophers. [Option ID = 10191]
3. Historians are not in favor of the sociology of scientific knowledge. [Option ID = 10189]

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4. Philosophers of science have supported the sociology of scientific knowledge. [Option ID = 10190]

Correct Answer :-

Some sociologists find some philosophical questions meaningless. [Option ID = 10192]

It is part of the folk wisdom of the field that historians have been increasingly enthusiastic about new developments in the sociology of scientific knowledge while philosophers of science have remained more resistant. Certainly, there has been a marked antipathy to some forms of philosophy by sociologists. Philosophy bashing perhaps reached its apogee with Bloor's (1976: 45) comment that "to ask questions of the sort which philosophers address to themselves is usually to paralyse the mind." Since the debate between Bloor (1981) and Laudan (1981), however, some philosophers have evinced sympathy for the work of the sociology of scientific knowledge (for example, Nickles, 1982, 1984). This suggests that it is perhaps no longer productive to dismiss all attempts at philosophizing science (Knorr-Cetina, 1982a).

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One good reason for not dismissing philosophy is that the positions of most authors both within and beyond the social study of science are based on deep-seated ontological commitments rather than upon any empirical account of science. This is why empirical evidence (of the sort provided by Laboratory Life) is unlikely to change any minds. And this is why those who read the book through realist spectacles will see error (for example, Bazerman, 1980: 17).

Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar. 1986 (1971). Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts. London, Sage.

The author suggests that the empirical evidence in Laboratory Life is likely to change the minds of those who have an ontological bent of mind. [Question ID = 2547]

1. None of these is true. [Option ID = 10188]
2. The above statement is true. [Option ID = 10186]

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3. The above statement is untrue. [Option ID = 10185]
4. The passage is unclear about the statement. [Option ID = 10187]

Correct Answer :-

The above statement is untrue. [Option ID = 10185]

Women's Enrolment and Total Enrolment in Professional Courses, India, 2001-02 to 2007-08

(Enrolment figures in thousands)

Note: Engineering includes Polytechnic and Diploma courses. Source: University Grants Commission

Read the above table carefully and answer the questions below:

The proportionate increase in total enrolment between 2001-02 and 2004-05 is the highest:

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[Question ID = 2553]

1. In Medicine. [Option ID = 10212]
2. In Education. [Option ID = 10210]
3. In Engineering. [Option ID = 10209]
4. In Law. [Option ID = 10211]

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Correct Answer :-

In Medicine. [Option ID = 10212]

Women's Enrolment and Total Enrolment in Professional Courses, India, 2001-02 to 2007-08

(Enrolment figures in thousands)

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